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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the Information Age, an increasing amount of personal information 
is contained in records maintained by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
phone companies, cable companies, merchants, bookstores, websites, 
hotels, landlords, employers and private sector entities.  Many private 
sector entities are beginning to aggregate the information in these records 
to create extensive digital dossiers.1 
The data in these digital dossiers increasingly flows from the private 
sector to the government, particularly for law enforcement use.  Law 
enforcement agencies have long sought personal information about 
individuals from various third parties to investigate fraud, white-collar 
crime, drug trafficking, computer crime, child pornography, and other types 
of criminal activity.  In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, the impetus for the government to gather personal information 
has greatly increased, since such data can be useful to track down terrorists 
and to profile airline passengers for more thorough searches.2  Detailed 
records of an individual’s reading materials, purchases, diseases, and 
website activity enable the government to assemble a profile of an 
individual’s finances, health, psychology, beliefs, politics, interests, and 
lifestyle.3  This data can unveil a person’s anonymous speech and personal 
associations.4 
The increasing amount of personal information flowing to the 
government poses significant problems with far-reaching social effects. 
Inadequately constrained government information-gathering can lead to at 
least three types of harms.  First, it can result in the slow creep toward a 
totalitarian state.5  Second, it can chill democratic activities and interfere 
 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. Government access to such data may implicate one’s First Amendment rights to freedom of 
speech and freedom of association.  See infra Part II.C. 
 5. See, e.g., DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES (1989); 
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 39 (1996); ( “[T]otalitarian regimes 
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with individual self-determination.6  Third, it can lead to the danger of 
harms arising in bureaucratic settings.7  Individuals, especially in times of 
crisis, are vulnerable to abuse from government misuse of personal 
information.  Once government entities have collected personal 
information, there are few regulations of how it can be used and how long 
it can be kept.  The bureaucratic nature of modern law enforcement 
institutions can enable sweeping searches, the misuse of personal data, 
improper exercises of discretion, unjustified interrogation and arrests, 
roundups of disfavored individuals, and discriminatory profiling.8  These 
types of harms often do not result from malicious intent or the desire for 
domination.  Justice Brandeis was prescient when he observed that people 
“are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men 
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”9 
The transfer of personal information from the private sector to the 
government thus requires some form of regulatory control, a way to 
balance privacy with effective law enforcement.  The first source for 
protecting privacy against infringement by law enforcement agencies is the 
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures 
and requires that the government first obtain judicial authorization before 
conducting a search or seizure.  According the Supreme Court, “[t]he 
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy 
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”10  The Court, 
however, has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
records maintained by third parties.11  In the void left by the absence of 
Fourth Amendment protection, a series of statutes provide some limited 
 
in Eastern Europe relied on information gathering and data storage to weaken the individual capacity 
for critical reflection and to repress any social movements outside their control.”); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 553, 560 (1995); Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech 
Government Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 471 (1999) (articulating problems of “how an 
authoritarian or totalitarian government might use and abuse information about citizens’ financial 
transactions”). 
 6. See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 
(2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999). 
 7. I previously explored the contrast between these two types of power in the context of private 
sector information collection and use.  See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases 
and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 10. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
 11. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 444 (1976).  For a more extensive discussion of these cases and others, see infra Part III.C. 
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restraints on government access to third party records.12  The protections of 
the statutory regime are far less exacting than those of the Fourth 
Amendment; information can be obtained through mere subpoenas and 
court orders, which have relatively few constraints and little meaningful 
judicial oversight.  Further, numerous classes of records are not covered at 
all.  Thus, there is a profoundly inadequate legal response to the emerging 
problem of government access to aggregations of data, “digital dossiers” 
that are increasingly becoming digital biographies. 
A similar scenario unfolded in 1928, when the Supreme Court held in 
Olmstead v. United States13 that wiretapping a person’s home telephone did 
not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court rigidly adhered to a 
conception of privacy that recognized only physical invasions, which did 
not include wiretapping because there was no physical trespass to the 
home.  Following Olmstead, Congress enacted § 605 of the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 to regulate wiretapping, but the law was 
grossly ineffective.14  Olmstead left a void in regulating the central threats 
to privacy in the twentieth century—wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance—which dramatically increased without adequate regulatory 
controls and oversight.15  In 1967, the Court overruled Olmstead.16  Today, 
it remains a relic of the past, a long discredited decision.  It symbolizes the 
Court’s lack of responsiveness to new technology, unwarranted formalism 
in its constitutional interpretation, and failure to see the larger purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Despite the fact that Olmstead was overruled, its spirit has been 
reincarnated.  The new Olmstead era, and its full implications are just 
beginning to emerge.  The Court’s current conception of privacy is as a 
form of total secrecy.17  As conceived by the Court, an individual’s hidden 
world should be protected.  It has expressed an interest in safeguarding the 
intimate information that individuals carefully conceal.  Privacy is about 
protecting the skeletons that are meticulously hidden in the closet.  Since 
information maintained by third parties is exposed to others, it is not 
 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
 14. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of § 605, see infra Part IV.A.1. 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
 16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 356, 356 (1967). 
 17. Elsewhere, I contend that privacy must be conceptualized in a multifaceted way, from the 
bottom-up by focusing on social practices rather than a rigid category with a single unifying essence or 
common denominator.  See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088–99 
(2002). 
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private, and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment.18  This 
conception of privacy is not responsive to life in the modern Information 
Age, where most personal information exists in the record systems of 
hundreds of entities.  The Court has turned its back on one of the most far-
reaching and potentially dangerous law enforcement practices of our times.  
Similar to the 40 years following Olmstead, the only form of regulatory 
control is statutory, which has thus far has been woefully inadequate. 
In this Article, I contend that this state of affairs poses one of the most 
significant threats to privacy in the twenty-first century.  The protection of 
privacy requires an “architecture of power.”19  This architecture represents 
the way that law structures social relationships.  The law creates and 
constructs the world we live in by shaping an individual’s relationships 
with other individuals, institutions, and the government.  Ideally, the law 
should establish an architecture of power to maintain an appropriate 
balance of power in these relationships.  Such a balance is critical to 
dignity, self-fulfillment, freedom, democracy, and other fundamental 
values.  In our highly bureaucratized world, personal information is an 
essential element of these relationships.  Protecting privacy with an 
architecture of power involves erecting a legal structure for responding to 
the ever-increasing data flows of the Information Age.  Beyond a set of 
individual rights, protecting privacy requires an architecture that regulates 
the way information may be collected and used. 
The focus of this Article is on our relationships with the government. 
An architecture of power must address two fundamental problems of 
government.  First, it should address how to control the population without 
stifling liberty, in other words, how to balance order and freedom.  Second, 
it should determine how to control the government so that it remains 
accountable to the people.  This includes preventing officials from abusing 
their power, and guarding against excessive growth in government power 
that threatens to override the power of the people.  One of the most 
 
 18. See infra Part III.C. 
 19. Lawrence Lessig has popularized the term “architecture” to refer to technological systems of 
governance—the way that computer code structures what we can do and how we act in cyberspace.  See 
generally, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter CODE]; 
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56 (1999).  I use this term 
more broadly than Lessig does, to refer to a particular power structure, not merely created by computer 
code or technology, but by the law.  Although certainly not antagonistic to law, Lessig’s view of 
privacy privileges technological to legal architecture.  According to Lessig, law merely sets the default 
entitlements to information, and technological architectures do the rest.  See id. at 160–61.  However, I 
believe that law has a much larger role to play in the protection of privacy.  Solove, supra note 7, at 
1445–55. 
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profound powers of the government is its machinery for enforcing the law, 
which increasingly requires personal information to function.  Therefore, 
an architecture of power must be developed to regulate the flow of personal 
information between the private sector and the government.  In this Article, 
I compare the architectures established by the Fourth Amendment to the 
current statutory regulatory regime, and articulate a theory identifying the 
types of architectural features that will create the appropriate balance 
between privacy and effective law enforcement. 
In Part II, I describe the extensive records of personal information that 
are maintained by third parties and the rapidly increasing information flows 
between the government and private sector entities.  I illustrate why these 
information flows present a serious threat to privacy and why an 
architecture of power is essential to ensure that privacy is adequately 
protected. 
In Part III, I describe the basic architecture of power that the Fourth 
Amendment endeavors to establish and explain why this architecture has 
many important features for the effective protection of privacy.  
Specifically, I contend that the Fourth Amendment embodies a Madisonian 
theory of government that aims to balance government control with liberty 
while at the same time keeping government power under control.  
Substantively, it restricts searches and seizures through the reasonableness 
requirement and provides procedural safeguards through the warrant and 
probable cause requirements.  These reflect the fractionalization of power 
among different government branches that James Madison believed was 
essential to restrain governmental power.  I quarrel with a number of 
prominent critics who contend that the Fourth Amendment should not 
concern itself with protecting privacy.  In the world of modern law 
enforcement, which has become significantly bureaucratized, privacy is an 
essential facet of the relationship between the government and the people.  
I explain at length why this is so, and defend the wisdom of the Fourth 
Amendment’s architecture of power against its critics. 
In Part IV, I critique the architecture of power created by the statutory 
regime that has filled the void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to third party records.  This architecture of power is a faulty 
one—uneven, overly complex, filled with gaps and loopholes, and 
containing numerous weak spots. 
In Part V, I suggest guidelines for an appropriate architecture of power 
to regulate government access to personal information in third party record 
systems.  Regarding the scope of the architecture, I develop a way to define 
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what types of government information gathering from third parties should 
be regulated.  This is a particularly difficult question.  Too broad of a scope 
could hinder legitimate law enforcement because criminal investigations 
often require the gathering of data from third parties.  Since the type of 
information collection that raises concern involves data gathered from 
dossiers maintained in private sector entities, I recommend that the 
architecture should encompass all instances where third parties share 
personal data contained within a “system of records,” a term I borrow from 
the federal Privacy Act.  Regarding the architecture’s structure, I explore a 
spectrum of procedural mechanisms to establish the delicate balance 
between privacy and law enforcement interests.  I recommend a fusion of 
Fourth Amendment architecture and the architecture of subpoenas and 
court orders. 
II.  GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GATHERING AND THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
A.  THIRD PARTY RECORDS AND THE GOVERNMENT 
We live in the early stages of the Information Age, a time when 
technology has given us unprecedented abilities to communicate, transfer 
and share information, access data, and analyze a profound array of facts 
and ideas.  The complete benefits of the Information Age do not simply 
come to us.  We must “plug in” to join in.  In other words, we must 
establish relationships with a panoply of companies.  To connect to the 
Internet, we must subscribe to an ISP, such as America Online (AOL) or 
Earthlink.  To be able to receive more than a few television channels, we 
need to open an account with a cable company.  Phone service, mobile 
phone service, and other utilities require us to open accounts with a number 
of entities. 
Further, life in modern society demands that we enter into numerous 
relationships with professionals (doctors, lawyers, accountants), businesses 
(restaurants, video rental stores), merchants (bookstores, mail catalog 
companies), publishing companies (magazines, newspapers), organizations 
(charities), financial institutions (banks, investment firms, credit card 
companies), landlords, employers, and other entities (insurance companies, 
security companies, travel agencies, car rental companies, hotels).  Our 
relationships with all of these entities generate records containing personal 
information necessary to establish an account and record of our 
transactions, preferences, purchases, and activities.  We are becoming a 
society of records, and these records are not held by us, but by third parties. 
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In earlier times, communities were smaller and people knew each 
other’s business.  Today, the predominant mode of spreading information is 
not through the flutter of gossiping tongues but through the language of 
electricity, where information pulses between massive record systems and 
databases.  From the standpoint of individual freedom, this development 
has both an upside and a downside.  Individuals can more readily escape 
from the curious eyes of the community, freeing themselves from stifling 
social norms inhibiting individuality and creativity.  On the other hand, an 
ever-growing series of records is created about almost every facet of a 
person’s life. 
These record systems are becoming increasingly useful to law 
enforcement officials.  Personal information can help the government 
detect fraud, espionage, fugitives, smuggling cartels, drug distribution 
rings, and terrorist cells. Information about a person’s financial 
transactions, purchases, and religious and political beliefs can assist law 
enforcement in investigating suspected criminals, individuals providing 
money and assistance to terrorists, or profiling people for more thorough 
searches at airports.20 
The government, therefore, has compelling reasons to obtain personal 
information found in records maintained by third parties that can reveal a 
myriad of details about a person.  For instance, from pen registers and trap 
and trace devices, the government can obtain a list of all the phone 
numbers dialed to or from a particular location, potentially revealing the 
people with whom a person associates.  From bank records, which contain 
one’s account activity and check writing, the government can discover the 
various companies and professionals that a person does business with (ISP, 
telephone company, credit card company, magazine companies, doctors, 
attorneys, and so on).21  Credit card company records can reveal where one 
eats and shops and which cultural events one attends.  The government can 
obtain one’s travel destinations and activities from travel agent records.  
From hotel records, it can discover the numbers a person dialed and the 
pay-per-view movies a person watched.22  The government can potentially 
 
 20. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Intricate Screening of Flyers In Works: Database Raises Privacy 
Concerns, WASH. POST., Feb. 1, 2002, at A1. 
 21. See Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“In a sense 
a person is defined by the checks he writes.  By examining them the agents get to know his doctors, 
lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the 
papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum.”). 
 22. See Dana Hawkins, Gospel of a Privacy Guru: Be Wary; Assume the Worst, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., June 25, 2001, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/nycu/tech/articles/010625/ 
SOLO10.DOC 9/3/02  8:49 AM 
2002] DISSIPATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY 1091 
obtain one’s thumbprint from car rental companies that collect them to 
investigate fraud.23  From cable companies, the government can obtain a 
list of the special pay channels subscribed to or the various pay-per-view 
events a person has watched.  From video stores, the government can 
access an inventory of the videos that a person has rented. 
The government can also glean a wealth of information from the 
extensive records employers maintain about their employees.24  Employers 
frequently monitor their employees.25  Some use Internet filter software to 
track how employees surf the World Wide Web.26  Employers often keep 
information about an employee’s e-mail use, including back-up copies of 
the contents of e-mail.  A number of employers also conduct drug testing,27 
and many require prospective employees to answer questionnaires asking 
about drug use, finances, mental health history, marital history, and 
sexuality.28  Some even require prospective hires to take a psychological 
screening test.29 
Landlords are another fertile source of personal information.  
Landlord records often contain financial, employment, and pet information, 
in addition to any tenant complaints.  Many landlords also maintain 
logbooks at the front desk where visitors sign in.  Some apartment 
 
tech/privacy.htm (describing hotel chain sharing lists of the movies, including pornographic ones, 
customers pay to watch in their hotel rooms). 
 23. Julia Scheeres, No Thumbprint, No Rental Car, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 21, 2001, at 
http://wired.com/news/print/0,1294,48552,00.html. 
 24. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, 
Privacy-Control, and the Fair Information Practices, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 743, 770–71 (describing lack 
of employee privacy). 
 25. See Dana Hawkins, Digital Skulduggery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 2, 2000 at 64.  For 
a detailed account of privacy in the workplace, see generally, JOHN D.R. CRAIG, PRIVACY AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1999). 
 26. J.C. Conklin, Under the Radar: Content Advisor Snoops as Workers Surf Web, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 15, 1998, at B8. 
 27. See Baggs v. Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 264, 272–73 (W.D. Mich. 1990) 
(holding no tort or contract remedies for at-will employee discharged for refusing to take a drug test).  
For an excellent discussion of the issue, see generally, Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, 
and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1996). 
 28. This information was requested in employer questionnaires in American Federation of 
Government Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 
F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).  The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 prevents 
inquiries of an applicant regarding disabilities; however, inquiries can be made “into the ability of an 
applicant to perform job related functions.”  42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2002).  An employer may 
require all entering employees to undergo a medical examination.  § 12112(d)(3). 
 29. See Sarah Schafer, Searching for a Workable Fit; Employers Try Psychological Tests to Help 
with More than the Right Hire, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1999, at V5. 
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buildings use biometric identification devices, such as hand scanners, to 
control access to common areas such as gyms. 
Increasingly, companies and entities that we have never established 
any contact with have dossiers about us.  From credit reporting agencies, 
the government can glean information relating to financial transactions, 
debts, creditors, and checking accounts.30  The government can also find 
out details about people’s race, income, opinions, political beliefs, health, 
lifestyle, and purchasing habits from database companies, since many 
companies keep extensive personal information on millions of 
Americans.31  One database company maintains information about people’s 
supermarket purchases, collected through the use of supermarket discount 
cards.  This data can reveal a complete inventory of one’s groceries, over-
the-counter medications, hygiene supplies, and contraceptive devices, 
among others.32 
Beyond the records described above, the Internet has the potential to 
become one of the government’s greatest information gathering tools.33  
There are two significant aspects of the Internet that make it such a 
revolutionary data collection device.  First, it gives many individuals a false 
sense of privacy.  The secrecy and anonymity of the Internet is often a 
mirage.  People are rarely truly anonymous because ISPs keep records of a 
subscriber’s screen name and pseudonyms.34  ISP account information can 
also include the subscriber’s name, address, phone numbers, passwords, 
information about web surfing sessions and durations, credit card and bank 
account information.35  By learning a person’s screen name, the 
government can identify the person behind the pseudonym postings to 
newsgroups or chatrooms.  For example, in McVeigh v. Cohen,36 AOL 
 
 30. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1408–09. 
 31. See id. at 1406–10. 
 32. Catalina Marketing Corp. has collected information about the supermarket purchases of thirty 
million households.  See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Behind the Instant Coupons, a Data-Crunching 
Powerhouse, WASH. POST., Dec. 31, 1998, at A20. 
 33. Although the rise of the Internet promises to herald a new age of freedom, there is a dark side 
to the Internet, where instead of a world of freedom, it is becoming a realm of domination and control.  
As Lawrence Lessig observes: “[C]yberspace does not guarantee its own freedom but instead carries an 
extraordinary potential for control.” LESSIG, CODE, supra note 19, at 58. 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 505 (W.D. Va. 1999) (obtaining 
from ISP the identity of a pseudonymous individual in an Internet chat room); United States v. 
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (obtaining the identity of an pseudonymous 
Internet user from ISP); State v. Schroeder, 613 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (obtaining from 
ISP the identity of individual who posted sexually suggestive comments on the Internet about another 
individual). 
 35. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2000), as amended by the USA-PATRIOT Act §§ 210–11. 
 36. 983 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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provided a Navy official with the identity of an individual using a 
pseudonym who indicated he was gay and worked in the military.  Based 
on this information, the Navy proceeded to initiate discharge proceedings 
under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.37 
A person’s ISP can also keep records about websurfing and e-mail 
activity.  At the government’s request, an ISP can keep logs of the e-mail 
addresses with which a person corresponds.  Further, the government can 
use ISP information to find out who uses a particular e-mail address.  Thus, 
it can discover the identities of the individuals with whom a person 
corresponds.  Further, if a person stores e-mail that is sent and received 
with the ISP, the government can obtain the contents of those e-mails. 
Second, the Internet is unprecedented in the degree of detailed 
information that can be gathered and stored.  It is one of the most powerful 
generators of records in human history.  Jerry Kang notes that as we 
wander through cyberspace, a host of entities assemble information that is 
“detailed, computer-processable, indexed to the individual, and 
permanent.”38  For example, as more information goes digital, and as 
copyright holders seek new ways to profit from their copyrights, the 
technological tools are in place to monitor the music people listen to and 
the books people read.39 
Websites often accumulate a great deal of information about their 
users.  Through the use of a “cookie,” which identifies a user by deploying 
a text file into the user’s computer, websites can detect the previous 
website and parts of the site a user accessed.40  This data is called 
“clickstream data” because it records nearly every click of the mouse.41  
Another information collection device, known as a “web bug,” involves  
hidden pixel tags secretly planted on a user’s hard drive that surreptitiously 
 
 37. When he called AOL, the official did not identify himself as a Navy official but instead 
stated that he had received a fax from a pseudonymous individual and that he wanted to find out the 
identity of the individual.  The AOL representative identified the individual. 
 38. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1199 
(1998). 
 39. See Julie E. Cohen, The Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 983 (1996) (“The same technologies that enable 
readers to access digitally stored works, however, also will enable copyright owners to generate precise 
and detailed records of such access.”); Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, supra note 6, at 849 
(noting that copyright management “systems enable copyrighted works themselves to carry out a 
pervasive monitoring of individual activity”).  See also Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office 
Be Obsolete in the Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 58 (1994). 
 40. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1411–12. 
 41. See id. at 1411. 
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gather data about the user.42  Websites also collect data when people fill out 
online questionnaires pertaining to their hobbies, health, and interests.  
Further, a person’s Internet postings are archived and do not readily 
disappear.43  As we invest more time on the Internet, strangers and 
unfamiliar organizations are keeping permanent records about our lives. 
Thus, the government can glean a substantial amount of information 
about visitors to a particular website.  For example, certain heath websites 
ask individuals to fill out questionnaires about their symptoms to determine 
whether they have a disease.44  Other websites have questionnaires relating 
to psychology and personality.45  From Internet retailers, the government 
can learn about the books, videos, music, and electronics that one 
purchases.  Some Internet retailers, such as “Amazon.com,” record all the 
purchases a person makes throughout the many years that the person has 
been shopping on the website.  Also, retailers use surveys to identify how a 
person rates books and videos.46  Based on this information, the 
government can discover a consumer’s interests, sexuality, political views, 
religious beliefs, and lifestyle.  Further, if a person buys a gift from an 
Internet retailer and has it mailed to a friend, the government may learn the 
friend’s name and address and develop a list of an individual’s friends and 
acquaintances. 
The government may also obtain information from websites that 
operate personalized home pages.  Home pages enable users to keep track 
of the stocks they own, favorite television channels, airfares for favorite 
destinations, and news of interest.47  Other websites, such as Microsoft 
Network’s calendar service, allow users to maintain their daily schedule 
and appointments.48  Further, there are some database companies that 
amass extensive profiles of people’s websurfing habits.49 
 
 42. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Fearing a Plague of ‘Web Bugs’; Invisible Fact-Gathering Code 
Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at E1; Leslie Walker, Bugs That Go Through 
Computer Screens, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at E1. 
 43. J.D. Lasica, The Net NEVER Forgets, SALON, Nov. 25, 1998, at 
http://www.salon.com/21st/feature/1998/11/25feature.html. 
 44. For a discussion of the types of information collected by health websites, see Pew Internet & 
American Life Project, Exposed Online: Why the New Federal Health Privacy Regulation Doesn’t 
Offer Much Protection to Internet Users  (Nov. 2001), at http://www.pewinternet.org. 
 45. Id. 
 46. This feature is available on Amazon.com at http://www.amazon.com. 
 47. For example, Yahoo!, at http://www.yahoo.com, offers a personalized web page service. 
 48. See http://calendar.msn.com/CalendarNorm.html. 
 49. See JIM STERNE, WHAT MAKES PEOPLE CLICK: ADVERTISING ON THE WEB, 238–41 (1997); 
Solove, Privacy and Power, surpa note 7, at 1412. 
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While life in the Information Age has brought us a dizzying amount of 
information, it has also placed a profound amount of information about our 
lives in the hands of numerous entities.  These digital dossiers are 
increasingly becoming digital biographies, a horde of aggregated bits of 
information combined to reveal a portrait of who we are based upon what 
we buy, the organizations we belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and 
which shows and videos we watch.50  This information is not held by 
trusted friends or family members, but by large bureaucracies that we do 
not know very well or sometimes do not even know at all. 
B.  GOVERNMENT-PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION FLOWS 
Information is becoming more fluid and more readily collected, 
stored, transferred, and combined with other information.  This increasing 
movement of information is frequently called “information flow.”51  
Elsewhere, I have discussed the problems of information flow among 
various private sector entities52 as well as from the government to the 
private sector.53  There is another problematic type of information flow that 
is rapidly escalating—data transfers from the private sector to the 
government. 
The government is increasingly contracting with private sector entities 
to acquire databases of personal information.  Database firms are willing to 
supply the information and the government is willing to pay for it.54  For 
example, the private sector company ChoicePoint, Inc. has multimillion 
dollar contracts with about thirty-five federal agencies including the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) to provide personal information.55  ChoicePoint’s database contains 
over ten billion records indexed by Social Security numbers.  The 
information is gathered from public records, private detectives, credit 
reporting agencies, and other sources.56 
 
 50. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Privacy, Public Records, and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). 
 51. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in 
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information 
Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1995). 
 52. See generally Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7. 
 53. See generally  Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 50. 
 54. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES 1, 27–28 (1997), available at 1997 
WL 784156, at *9. 
 55. See Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It 
May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1. 
 56. See id. 
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The Department of Defense allegedly has purchased information 
collected by a private sector company about students’ web surfing habits.57  
Thus far, the agency has only obtained aggregate information, but in light 
of the events of September 11, there might be a strong interest in acquiring 
personally identifiable information about students’ web searching habits 
because some of the terrorists posed as students. 
A second form of information flow from the private sector to the 
government emerges when the government requests private sector records 
for particular investigations or compels their disclosure by subpoena or 
court order.  Voluntary disclosure of customer information is within the 
third party company’s discretion.58  Further, whether a person is notified of 
the request and given the opportunity to challenge it in court is also within 
the company’s discretion.59 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have changed the climate for 
private sector-to-government information flows.  Law enforcement 
officials have a greater desire to obtain information that could be helpful in 
identifying terrorists or their supporters, including information about what 
people read, with whom they associate, their religion, and their lifestyle.  
Following the September 11 attack, the FBI simply has requested records 
from businesses without a subpoena, warrant, or court order.60  Recently, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft has revised longstanding guidelines for 
FBI surveillance practices.  Under the previous version, the FBI could 
monitor public events and mine the Internet for information only when 
“facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is 
being, or will be committed.”61  Under the revised version, the FBI can 
engage in these types of information gathering without any requirement 
that this gathering be part of a legitimate investigation or related in any 
manner to criminal wrongdoing.62  The FBI can now collect “publicly 
available information, whether obtained directly or through services or 
resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such 
 
 57. See Jeffrey Benner, The Army is Watching Your Kid, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 29, 2001, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41476,00.html. 
 58. See infra Part IV. 
 59. See infra Part IV. 
 60. Daniela Deane, Legal Niceties Aside . . . ; Federal Agents Without Subpoenas Asking Firms 
for Records, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2001, at E1. 
 61. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE 
AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS § II.C.1 (March 21, 1989). 
 62. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING 
ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS § VI (May 30, 2002). 
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information; and information voluntarily provided by private entities.”63  
Further, the FBI can “carry out general topical research, including 
conducting online searches and accessing online sites and forums.”64 
 In conjunction with the government’s greater desire for personal 
information, the private sector has become more willing to supply it. 
Before September 11, the private sector, in certain circumstances, strongly 
opposed sharing information with the government.  For example, when 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed a Washington, D.C. 
bookstore’s records of Monica Lewinsky’s purchases,65 the store spent over 
$100,000 in legal costs vigorously opposing the subpoena.66  In March of 
2000, the Tattered Cover, a bookstore in Denver, Colorado, contested a 
search warrant in order to protect its customers’ privacy.67  Prior to 
September 11, an attorney for Amazon.com revealed that law enforcement 
officials informally requested information about book, music, and video 
purchases.  Amazon.com “typically” informed law enforcement officials 
that it valued its customers’ privacy, it would not disclose their 
information, albeit with some exceptions.68 
 September 11 changed these attitudes.  Background check companies, 
for instance, experienced a large boost in business after September 11.69  
An Internet company shut down its free anonymous Internet surfing 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at VI.B.1.  See also Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, FBI Given More Latitude: New 
Surveillance Rules Remove Evidence Hurdle, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at A1. 
 65. In particular, Starr was interested in discovering if Lewinsky had purchased Nicholson 
Barker’s Vox, a novel that pertained to phone sex.  See Mike Feinsilber, Bookstore Refuses to Comply 
with Starr’s Subpoena for Lewinsky Book List, NANDO TIMES NEWS (1998), 
http://archive.nandotimes.com/newsroom/nt/529nonono.html. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Felicity Barringer, Using Books as Evidence Against Their Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 
2001, at WK3; Justin Rickard, Police vs. Bookstore in Privacy Rights Case, (Dec. 16, 2000), at 
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/resources/bookstore.asp.  See also Our Books Are Our Business, 
ABCNEWS.COM, at http://my.abcnews.go.com/2020_020216_bookstores_feature.htm.  The technique 
of obtaining information from bookstores has escalated since the Monica Lewinsky episode.  In 2000–
01, prior to September 11, Borders bookstores in Massachusetts and Kansas were searched and 
subpoenaed.  See Barringer, supra, at WK3.  In the Tattered Cover case, the Colorado Supreme Court 
recently sided with the bookstore.  See Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 
2002). 
 68. Barringer, supra note 67. 
 69. Lisa Guernsey, What Did You Do Before the War?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at G1.  See 
also Victor Schachter & Trey Wichmann, The Aftermath of September 11: No Longer Business as 
Usual for Security, Safety to Privacy in the Workplace, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE PRIVACY LAW: 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS & ISSUES IN A SECURITY CONSCIOUS WORLD 623, 627 (Francoise Gilbert, John 
B. Kennedy & Paul M. Schwartz eds. 2002) (describing increase in employer scrutiny of applicants’ 
backgrounds). 
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service.70  Several large financial companies developed agreements to 
provide information to federal law enforcement agencies.71 
 Indeed, in times of crisis or when serious crimes are at issue, the 
incentives to disclose information to the government are quite significant.  
Companies do not want to withhold information that will impede the 
investigation of a terrorist or murderer.  They want to cooperate and help 
out.72 
When private sector entities refuse to cooperate, the government can 
compel production of the information by issuing a subpoena or obtaining a 
court order.  As discussed in Part IV, these devices are very different from 
warrants because they offer little protection to the individual being 
investigated.  Notification of the target of the investigation is often within 
the discretion of the third party.73  Further, it is up to the third party to 
challenge the subpoena.74  So, rather than spend the money and resources 
to challenge the subpoena, especially when the information is not valuable 
to their interests, companies can simply turn it over or permit the 
government to search their records. 
Moreover, ISPs are integral to law enforcement officials’ ability to 
investigate.  Since September 11, AOL and Earthlink, two of the largest 
ISPs, have readily cooperated with the investigation of the terrorist 
attacks.75  Often, ISPs have their own technology to turn over 
communications and information about targets of investigations.  If they 
lack the technology, law enforcement officials can install devices such as 
“Carnivore” to locate the information.76  Carnivore, now renamed to the 
more innocuous “DCS1000,” is a computer program installed by the FBI at 
 
 70. Elinor Mills Abreu, SafeWeb Shuts Free Anonymous Web Service, INFOWAR.COM, Nov. 11, 
2001, at http://www.infowar.com/class_1/01/class1_112001a_j.shtml. 
 71. See Paul Beckett, Big Banks, U.S. Weigh Pooling Data on Terror, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 
2001, at A2; Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Financial Database to Screen Accounts: Joint Effort Targets 
Suspicious Activities, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at E1. 
 72. See David E. Rosenbaum, A Nation Challenged: Questions of Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2001, at B7. 
 73. See infra  Part IV. 
 74. See infra  Part IV. 
 75. See Mike Snider, Privacy Advocates Fear Trade-Off for Security; FBI Sends Warrants to 
Service Providers, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2001, at D8. 
 76. See Robert Lemos, FBI Taps ISPs in Hunt for Attackers, ZD NET Sept. 12, 2001, at 
http://zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,5096919–2,00.html. 
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an ISP.77  It can monitor all ISP e-mail traffic and search for certain 
keywords in the content or headers of the e-mail messages.78 
These developments are troubling because private sector companies 
often have weak policies governing when information may be disclosed to 
the government.  The privacy policy for the MSN network, an affiliation of 
several Microsoft, Inc. websites such as Hotmail (an e-mail service), 
Health, Money, Newsletters, eShop, and Calendar, states: 
MSN Web sites will disclose your personal information, without notice, 
only if required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that such 
action is necessary to: (a) conform to the edicts of the law or comply 
with legal process served on Microsoft or the site. . . .79 
Though somewhat unclear, this privacy policy appears to require a 
subpoena or court order for the government to obtain personal data. 
Amazon.com’s privacy policy reads, “We release account and other 
personal information when we believe release is appropriate to comply 
with law . . . or protect the rights, property, or safety of Amazon.com, our 
users, or others.”80  It is unclear from this policy the extent to which 
Amazon.com, in its discretion, can provide information to law enforcement 
officials. 
EBay, a popular online auction website, has a policy stating that 
[it] cooperates with law enforcement inquiries, as well as other third 
parties to enforce laws, such as: intellectual property rights, fraud and 
other rights.  We can (and you authorize us to) disclose any information 
about you to law enforcement or other government officials as we, in our 
sole discretion, believe necessary or appropriate, in connection with an 
investigation of fraud, intellectual property infringements, or other 
activity that is illegal or may expose us or you to legal liability.81 
This policy gives eBay almost complete discretion to provide the 
government with whatever information it deems appropriate. 
 Truste.com, a nonprofit organization providing a “trustmark” for 
participating websites that agree to abide by certain privacy principles, has 
drafted a model privacy statement that reads, “We will not sell, share, or 
 
 77. E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: U.S. Government Surveillance of Internet Transmissions, 6 
VA. J. L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 49, 96 (2001). 
 78. The USA-PATRIOT Act enshrined the FBI’s Carnivore device into law.  USA-PATRIOT Act 
§ 216, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3133(a)(3) (1994). 
 79. MSN Statement of Privacy, at http://privacy.msn.com. 
 80. Amazon.com Privacy Notice, at http://www.amazon.com. 
 81. Privacy Policy, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/png-priv.html. 
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rent [personal] information to others in ways different from what is 
disclosed in this statement.”82  This policy, however, does not contain any 
provision about supplying information to the government, and the quoted 
statement appears to be referring to other private sector entities such as 
marketers.83  Further, the policy does not inform people that under existing 
law, information must be disclosed to the government pursuant to a 
subpoena or court order.84 
The government is also increasing information flow from the private 
sector by encouraging it to develop new information-gathering 
technologies.  Private sector firms stand to profit from developing such 
technologies.  Recently, private sector companies have expressed an 
eagerness to develop national identification systems and face-recognition 
technology.85  In addition, the federal government has announced a “wish 
list” for new surveillance and investigation technologies.86  Companies that 
invent such technologies can obtain lucrative government contracts. 
The government has also funded private sector information-gathering 
initiatives.  For instance, a company that began assembling a national 
database of photographs and personal information as a tool to guard against 
consumer fraud has received $1.5 million from the Secret Service to aid in 
the development of the database.87 
In certain circumstances, where the private sector is not a willing 
collaborator with the government, new laws require their participation.  For 
example, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 requires banks to maintain records 
of financial transactions to facilitate law enforcement needs, in particular, 
investigations and prosecutions of criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.88  
Congress passed the Act out of concern that the computerization of records 
would complicate white-collar crime prosecutions.89  Under the Act, all 
federally insured banks must maintain records of each account holder’s 
financial transactions.  Furthermore, the Secretary of the Treasury is 
 
 82. Model Privacy Statement, at http://truste.com/bus/pub_sample.html. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. For example, Larry Ellison, the CEO of Oracle Corporation, proposed a system of national 
identification involving biometrics.  See Larry Ellison, Digital IDs Can Help Prevent Terrorism, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 8, 2001, at A26. 
 86. See Greg Schneider & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Pentagon Makes Rush Order for Anti-Terror 
Technology, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at A10. 
 87. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Drivers Angered over Firm’s Purchase of Photos, WASH. POST, Jan. 
28, 1999, at E1; Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Liz Leyden, U.S. Helped Fund Photo Database of Driver IDs: 
Firm’s Plan Seen as Way to Fight Identity Crime, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1999, at A1. 
 88. 31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1994). 
 89. H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY 24 (1994). 
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authorized to require that certain domestic financial transactions be reported 
to the government.90  Under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, a bank must report every financial transaction in excess of 
$10,000.91 
In addition, Congress has passed the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to assist with investigations 
of parents who do not pay child support.  It requires that employers collect 
personal information from all new employees including Social Security 
numbers, addresses, and wages.92 
Congress has also passed the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994,93 which requires telecommunications 
service providers to develop technology to assist government surveillance of 
individuals.94 
All of this suggests that businesses and government have become 
allies.  When their interests diverge, new laws requiring cooperation are 
passed.  We are increasingly seeing collusion, partly voluntary, partly 
coerced, between the private sector and the government. 
C.  THE DANGERS OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GATHERING 
Although there are certainly many legitimate needs for law 
enforcement officials to obtain personal data, there are also many dangers 
to unfettered government access to information.  There are at least three 
general types of harms.  The first has been discussed under the rubric of the 
“Big Brother metaphor.”95  Big Brother is the totalitarian government in 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, which achieved total domination 
by monitoring every facet of its citizens’ private lives.96  Although 
elsewhere it is suggested that the Big Brother metaphor does not capture 
the problem of the collection and use of personal information by private 
 
 90. 31 U.S.C. § 1081. 
 91. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(1).  In California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 67–69 
(1974), the Court held that the bankers lacked standing to challenge the regulations.  Shultz effectively 
resolved the Fourth Amendment rights of the individuals with accounts at the bank.  Id.  According to the 
third party doctrine, these individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records.  Id. 
 92. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).  See generally Robert O’ Harrow, Jr., Uncle Sam Has All Your 
Numbers, WASH. POST, June 27,1999, at A1. 
 93. Pub. L. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994). 
 94. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 95. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1393. 
 96. See generally  GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
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sector entities,97 it certainly remains persuasive in the context of 
government information-gathering.  Indeed, historically, totalitarian 
governments have developed elaborate systems for collecting data about 
people’s private lives.98  Although the possibility of the rise of a totalitarian 
state is remote, if our society takes on certain totalitarian features, it could 
significantly increase the extent to which the government can exercise 
social control. 
Second, government information-gathering can severely constrain 
democracy and individual self-determination.  Paul Schwartz illustrates this 
with his theory of “constitutive privacy.”99  According to Schwartz, privacy 
is essential to both individuals and communities: “[C]onstitutive privacy 
seeks to create boundaries about personal information to help the individual 
and define terms of life within the community.”100  As a form of regulation 
of information flow, privacy shapes “the extent to which certain actions or 
expressions of identity are encouraged or discouraged.”101  Schwartz 
contends that extensive government oversight over an individual’s 
activities can “corrupt individual decision making about the elements of 
one’s identity.”102  Further, inadequate protection of privacy threatens 
deliberative democracy by inhibiting people from engaging in democratic 
activities.103  This can occur unintentionally; even if government entities 
are not attempting to engage in social control, their activities can have 
collateral effects that harm democracy and self-determination. 
For example, government information-collection interferes with an 
individual’s freedom of association.  The Court has held that there is a 
“vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s 
associations.”104  In a series of cases, the Court has restricted the 
government’s ability to compel disclosure of membership in an 
organization.105  In Baird v. State Bar,106 for example, the Court has 
declared: “[W]hen a State attempts to make inquiries about a person’s 
 
 97. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 7, at 1417–19. 
 98. See Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1998). 
 99. See Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, supra note 6, at 1658–59. 
 100. Id. at 1664. 
 101. Id. at 1665. 
 102. Id. at 1657. 
 103. See id. at 1651–52. 
 104. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
 105. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960) (holding unconstitutional a law 
requiring teachers to disclose membership in organizations); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 466 (restricting 
compelled disclosure of membership lists of NAACP). 
 106. 401 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment.  Broad 
and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas . . . discourage 
citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.”107  The 
government’s extensive ability to glean information about one’s 
associations from third party records without any Fourth Amendment 
limitations seems to present an end-run around the principles articulated in 
these cases.108 
Extensive government information-gathering from third party records 
also implicates the right to speak anonymously.  In Talley v. California,109 
the Court struck down a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous 
handbills as a violation of the First Amendment.  The Court held that 
“[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have 
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or 
not at all.”110  Further, the Court reasoned, “identification and fear of 
reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of 
importance.”111  The Court reiterated its view of the importance of 
protecting anonymous speech in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission.112  The Court declared that “an author’s decision to remain 
anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the 
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by 
the First Amendment.”113  These cases, however, restricted the government 
from requiring individuals to identify themselves when speaking.  With 
government information-gathering from third parties, namely ISPs, the 
government can readily obtain an anonymous or pseudonymous speaker’s 
identity.  Only computer-savvy users can speak with more secure 
anonymity.  When private parties attempt to obtain the identifying 
information, courts have held that subpoenas for this information must 
contain heightened standards.114  However, no such heightened standards 
apply when the government seeks to obtain the information. 
 
 107. Id. at 6. 
 108. It is unclear how receptive the Court will be to this argument.  The Court has held that mere 
information gathering about a group’s public activities did not harm First Amendment interests enough 
to give rise to standing.  See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1972). 
 109. 362 U.S. 60, 63–64 (1960). 
 110. Id. at 64. 
 111. Id. at 65. 
 112. 514 U.S. 334, 334 (1995). 
 113. Id. at 342. 
 114. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1093–95 (W.D. Wash. 2001); 
Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
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Further, beyond typical anonymity is the ability to receive information 
anonymously.  As Julie Cohen persuasively contends: “The freedom to 
read anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition, and the choice of 
reading materials just as expressive of identity, as the decision to use or 
withhold one’s name.”115  The lack of sufficient controls on the 
government’s obtaining the extensive records about how individuals surf 
the web, the books and magazines they read, and the videos or television 
channels they listen to can implicate this interest.116 
Additionally, the increasing information flow between the private 
sector and the government not only implicates the privacy of the target of 
an investigation, but can also affect the privacy of other individuals.  The 
names, addresses, phone numbers, and a variety of data about a number of 
individuals can be ensnared in third party records pertaining to the target. 
A third type of danger promoted by government information-gathering 
consists of the harms routinely arising in bureaucratic settings: decisions 
without adequate accountability, dangerous pockets of unfettered 
discretion, and choices based on short-term goals without consideration of 
the long-term consequences or the larger social effects.  For example, this 
can lead to dangers such as hasty judgment in times of crisis, the disparate 
impact of law enforcement on particular minorities, cover-ups, petty 
retaliation for criticism, blackmail, framing, sweeping and disruptive 
investigations, racial, ethnic, or religious profiling, and so on.  As David 
Garrow aptly observes: 
I always had been much impressed by Joseph Conrad’s message in The 
Heart of Darkness.  I have come to feel, however, that the true nature of 
evil is much more akin to that described by Hannah Arendt than to 
 
 115. Cohen, supra note 39, at 1012. 
 116. Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court in Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 
1044, 1044 (Colo. 2002), concluded that heightened scrutiny should apply to instances where police use 
a search warrant to seek records of a person’s book purchases at bookstores.  The holding was premised 
under Colorado’s constitution: 
We turn to our Colorado Constitution, which we now hold requires a more substantial 
justification from the government than is required by the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution when law enforcement officials attempt to use a search warrant to obtain 
an innocent, third-party bookstore’s customer purchase records. 
Id. at 1056.  The court’s holding was premised on a recognition that police searches of bookstores could 
chill bookstore customers’ First Amendment rights to read anonymously: “When a person buys a book 
at a bookstore, he engages in activity protected by the First Amendment because he is exercising his 
right to read and receive ideas and information.  Any governmental action that interferes with the 
willingness of customers to purchase books, or booksellers to sell books, thus implicates First 
Amendment concerns.”  Id. at 1052.  The court concluded that “law enforcement officials must 
demonstrate a sufficiently compelling need for the specific customer purchase record sought from the 
innocent, third-party bookstore.”  Id. at 1058. 
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Conrad’s horror.  The danger we all face is not the consequences of man 
unbound from the restraints of society.  It is the surrender of independent 
and critical judgment by people who work in large organizations.  Evil is 
far more the product of people in complex institutions acting without 
personal reflection than it is something inherent in individual man.117 
The most frequent problem is not that law enforcement agencies will 
be lead by corrupt and abusive leaders, although this arguably happened to 
some degree for nearly fifty years when J. Edgar Hoover directed the 
FBI.118  The problem is the risk that judgment will not be exercised in a 
careful and thoughtful manner.  In other words, it stems from certain forms 
of government information-gathering shifting power toward a bureaucratic 
machinery that is poorly regulated and susceptible to abuse.  This shift has 
profound social effects because it alters the balance of power between the 
government and the people, exposing individuals to a series of harms, 
increasing their vulnerability and decreasing the degree of power that they 
exercise over their lives. 
As police forces grew in size, number, and technological surveillance 
capabilities, the relationship between government and citizen transformed.  
When the Fourth Amendment was ratified, organized police forces did not 
exist.119  Colonial policing was “[the] business of amateurs.”120  Sheriffs 
did not have a professional staff, and relied heavily on ordinary citizens to 
serve as constables or watchmen, whose primary duties consisted of 
patrolling rather than investigating.121  The government typically became 
involved in criminal investigations only after an arrest was made or a 
suspect was identified.122  In ordinary criminal cases, police rarely 
conducted searches prior to arrest.123 
Organized police forces developed during the nineteenth century, and 
by the middle of the twentieth century, policing reached an unprecedented 
level of organization and coordination.124  At the center of the rise of 
 
 117. DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 18 (1980). 
 118. See generally CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS (1991); 
RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER (1987). 
 119. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of 
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 408 (1995). 
 120. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1993). 
 121. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 830–31 
(1994). 
 122. See Stuntz, supra note 119, at 401. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 120, at 67; DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN 
UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE 1800–1887, 
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modern law enforcement was the development of the FBI.  When the FBI 
was being formed in 1908, there was significant opposition in Congress to 
a permanent federal police force.125  Members of Congress expressed 
trepidation over the possibility that such an investigatory agency could 
ascertain “matters of scandal and gossip” that could wind up being used for 
political purposes.126  These concerns related to the potential dangers of the 
agency’s information-gathering capabilities, and as will be discussed later, 
the fears became realities during the course of the FBI’s history. 
Today, we live in an endless matrix of law and regulation, 
administered by a multitude of vast government bureaucracies.  Like most 
everything else in modern society, law enforcement has become 
bureaucratized.127  There are large police departments armed with 
sophisticated technology that coordinate with each other.128  There are 
massive agencies devoted entirely to investigation and intelligence.  As 
William Stuntz notes, “The problem of discretionary, suspicionless 
searches and seizures in ordinary criminal cases is an incident of organized 
police forces—of a system that gives to police officers the job of 
investigating crimes, identifying suspects, and choosing which suspects to 
pursue.”129 
Many factors make it difficult for law enforcement officials to strike 
the delicate balance between order and liberty.  Among them, there are 
tremendous pressures on law enforcement agencies to capture criminals, 
solve notorious crimes, keep crime under control, and prevent acts of 
violence and terrorism.  This highly stressful environment can lead to short 
cuts, bad exercises of discretion, or obliviousness and insensitivity to 
people’s freedom.  One of the most crucial aspects of keeping government 
power under control is a healthy scrutiny.  Most law enforcement officials, 
however, are unlikely to view themselves with distrust and skepticism.  
 
at  9 (1979); ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860–1920, at 42–44 (1981); Stuntz, 
supra note 119, at 435. 
 125. GENTRY, supra note 118, at 112.  The organization created in 1908 was called the Bureau of 
Investigation (BI); it became the FBI in 1935.  See id. at 113. 
 126. Id. at 111–12. 
 127. See, e.g., Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, in MODERN 
POLICING 51, 68–82 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992).  Reiss points out that one of the 
distinctive and unique facets of law enforcement bureaucracy in the United States “is that the greatest 
discretionary powers are lodged with the lowest-ranking officials in the system and that most 
discretionary decisions are not made a matter of record.”  Id. at 74. 
 128. See, e.g., WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF 
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 118 (1998) (“Police forces today not only have access to nationwide 
(and often worldwide) records, but much of that access is directly available to officers in the field.”). 
 129. See Stuntz, supra note 119, at 408. 
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Police and prosecutors are too enveloped in the tremendous responsibilities 
and pressures of their jobs to maintain an unbiased and balanced 
perspective. 
In short, one need not fear the rise of a totalitarian state or the 
inhibition of democratic activities to desire strong controls on the power of 
the government in collecting personal information.  Specifically, 
government information-gathering must be regulated for a number of 
reasons. 
First, by obtaining private sector records, the government can conduct 
the type of “fishing expeditions” that the Framers feared.130  The 
government can increasingly amass vast dossiers on millions of 
individuals, conduct sweeping investigations, and search for vast quantities 
of information from a wide range of sources, without any probable cause or 
particularized suspicion.  Information is easier to obtain, and it is becoming 
more centralized.  Our digital dossiers are beginning to resemble digital 
biographies that are increasingly flowing to the government.  As Justice 
Douglas noted in his dissent when the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Bank Secrecy Act: 
These [bank records] are all tied to one’s social security number; and 
now that we have the data banks, these other items will enrich that 
storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat—by pushing one 
button—to get in an instant the names of the 190 million Americans who 
are subversives or potential and likely candidates.131 
Second, as more private sector data becomes available to the 
government, there could be a de facto national database, or a large database 
of “suspicious” individuals.132  Federal governmental entities have 
conducted substantial information-gathering efforts on political groups 
throughout the twentieth century.  From 1940 through 1973, for example, 
the FBI and CIA conducted a secret domestic intelligence operation, 
reading the mail of thousands of citizens.133  The FBI’s investigations 
extended to members of the women’s liberation movement and prominent 
critics of the Vietnam War, and the FBI obtained information about 
 
 130. It is virtually undisputed that one of the central reasons the Framers created the Fourth 
Amendment was to guard against the use of general warrants.  See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS 
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse 
than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994). 
 131. California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
 132. For a discussion of the harms of a national identification system, see Richard Sobel, The 
Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37 
(2002).  See also Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 50. 
 133. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 138. 
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personal and sexual relationships that could be used to discredit them.134 
During the McCarthy era and the 1980s, the FBI sought information from 
libraries about the reading habits of certain individuals.135  Between 1967 
and 1970, the U.S. Army conducted wide-ranging surveillance, amassing 
extensive personal information about a broad group of individuals.136  The 
impetus for the Army’s surveillance was a series of riots that followed Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination.137 The information collected 
involved data about finances, sexual activity, and health.138  In 1970, 
Congress significantly curtailed the Army’s program, and the records of 
personal information were eventually destroyed.139  The danger of these 
information-gathering efforts is not only that it chills speech or threatens 
lawful protest, but also that it makes people more vulnerable by exposing 
them to potential future dangers such as leaks, security lapses, and 
improper arrests.  For example, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) compiled about 18,000 files on 
various dissident individuals and groups.  During a national television 
broadcast, PPD officials disclosed the names of some of the people on 
whom files were kept.140 
Third, government entities are using personal information in databases 
to conduct automated investigations.  In 1977, in order to detect fraud, the 
federal government began matching its computer employee records with 
those of people receiving federal benefits.141  With the use of computers to 
match records of different government entities, the government 
investigated millions of people.  Some matching programs used data 
obtained from private sector sources (merchants and marketing companies) 
to discover tax, welfare, and food stamp fraud as well as to identify drug 
couriers.142 Computer matching raised significant concerns, and in 1988, 
 
 134. See id. at 143. 
 135. See id. at 146; Barringer, supra note 67, at WK3. 
 136. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 143. 
 137. Although the Army’s surveillance efforts were challenged before the Supreme Court on First 
Amendment grounds in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 1 (1972), the Court concluded that the targets of the 
information gathering lacked standing because they only alleged “generalized yet speculative 
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way that 
would cause direct harm to [them].”  Id. at 13. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 7. 
 140. See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 
1335 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 141. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 86 (1995); Robert Gellman, Does Privacy 
Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 198 (Philip E. Agre & Marc 
Rotenberg, eds., 1997). 
 142. See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 209–10 (1988). 
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Congress finally passed a law regulating this practice.143  The law has been 
strongly criticized as providing scant substantive guidance and having little 
practical effect.144  This type of automated investigation is troubling 
because it alters the way that government investigations typically take 
place.  Usually, the government has some form of particularized suspicion, 
a factual basis to believe that a particular person may be engaged in illegal 
conduct.  Particularized suspicion keeps the government’s profound 
investigative powers in check preventing widespread surveillance and 
snooping into the lives and affairs of all citizens.  Computer matches, 
Priscilla Regan contends, investigate everyone, and most people who are 
investigated are innocent.145 
With the new information supplied by the private sector, there is an 
increased potential for more automated investigations, such as searches for 
all people who purchase books about particular topics or those who visit 
certain websites, or perhaps even people whose personal interests fit a 
profile for those likely to engage in certain forms of criminal activity.  
Automated investigations based on profiles share the problems experienced 
with profiling: the inappropriate use of stereotypes, race, and religion.  
Profiling or automated investigations based on information gathered 
through digital dossiers results in targets being inappropriately singled out 
for more airport searches, police investigations, or even arrest or detention. 
Fourth, the government can use dossiers of personal information in 
mass roundups of distrusted or suspicious individuals whenever the 
political climate is ripe.  As Pamela Samuelson observed: “One factor that 
enabled the Nazis to efficiently round up, transport, and seize assets of 
Jews (and others they viewed as ‘undesirables’) was the extensive 
repositories of personal data available not only from the public sector but 
 
 143. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 
102 Stat. 2507, codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(8)–(13), e(12), (o)–(r), (u).  The CMPPA 
requires agencies to formulate procedural agreements before exchanging computerized record systems 
and establishes Data Integrity Boards within each agency.  See id.  The CMPPA establishes Data 
Integrity Boards within each agency to oversee matching, requires agencies to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of proposed matching endeavors, and requires agencies to notify individuals of the termination 
of benefits due to computer matching and to permit individuals an opportunity to refute the termination.  
See id. 
 144. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: QUALITY OF DECISIONS AND 
SUPPORTING ANALYSES LITTLE AFFECTED BY 1988 ACT (1993); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra 
note 5, at 101; INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK 
FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: 
DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 15 (Apr. 1997); Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 5, at 
588 (noting that CMPPA “creates no substantive guidelines to determine when matching is 
acceptable”). 
 145. See REGAN, supra note 141, at 90. 
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also from private sector sources.”146  In the United States, information 
gathering greatly assisted the roundups of disfavored groups, including 
Japanese-Americans during World War II.  Following the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941, the FBI detained thousands of Japanese-
American community leaders in internment camps.147  These initial 
roundups were facilitated by an index of potentially subversive people of 
Japanese descent compiled by the Justice Department beginning in the late 
1930s.148  In 1942, in the name of national security, about 120,000 people 
of Japanese descent living on the West Coast were imprisoned in 
internment camps.149  The Census Bureau prepared special tabulations of 
Japanese-Americans, which, according to a 1942 War Department report, 
“became the basis for the general evacuation and relocation plan.”150 
The gathering of personal data also facilitated the Palmer Raids of 
1919–20 (also known as the “Red Scare”).  In 1991, a rash of bombings 
sparked the Palmer Raids, one of which damaged the home of Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer.151  Bombs went off in eight other cities shortly 
thereafter and letter bombs were mailed to many elites.152  In a climate rife 
with fear of “Reds,” anarchists, and labor unrest,153 Congress tasked the 
Bureau of Investigation (again, the organization that later became the FBI 
in 1935) with addressing these terrorist threats.154  Under the direction of a 
young J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau of Investigation developed an extensive 
index of hundreds of thousands of radicals.155  This data was used to 
conduct a massive series of raids, in which over 10,000 individuals 
suspected of being Communists were rounded up, many without 
 
 146. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1143 (2000). 
See also DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 373–74 (1989). 
 147. ERIC. K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL I. IZUMI, JERRY KANG, & FRANK H. WU, 
RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 38 (2001). 
 148. See id. at 96. 
 149. See id. at 38–39.  See also Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial 
Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 941 (1999).  See generally Eugene V. Rostow, 
The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). 
 150. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 138.  See also DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE 
COMPUTER STATE 24 (1983). 
 151. FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA’S 
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 33 (1980). 
 152. See GENTRY, supra note 118, at 76.  Most of the letter bombs were halted at the Post Office 
due to inadequate postage.  See id. 
 153. See CHARLES H. MCCORMICK, SEEING REDS: FEDERAL SURVEILLANCE OF RADICALS IN THE 
PITTSBURGH MILL DISTRICT, 1917–1921, 120 (1997); POWERS, supra note 118, at 69. 
 154. See MCCORMICK, supra note 153, at 103. 
 155. See DONNER, supra note 151, at 34; GENTRY, supra note 118, at 79; POWERS, supra note 
118, at 68. 
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warrants.156  The raids resulted in a number of deportations, many based 
solely on membership in certain organizations.157  When prominent figures 
in the legal community such as Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., criticized the raids, Hoover began assembling a 
dossier on each of them.158 
Additionally, personal information gathered by the FBI enabled the 
extensive hunt for Communists during the late 1940s and 1950s—a period 
of history that has since been criticized as a severe over-reaction, resulting 
in the mistreatment of numerous individuals, and impeding the reform 
agenda begun in the New Deal.159  According to Ellen Schrecker, federal 
agencies’ “bureaucratic interests, including the desire to present themselves 
as protecting the community against the threat of internal subversion, 
inspired them to exaggerate the danger of radicalism.”160  Senator Joseph 
R. McCarthy, the figure who symbolized the anti-Communist movement, 
received substantial assistance from Hoover, who secretly released 
information about suspected Communists to McCarthy.161  Further, the FBI 
supplied a steady stream of names of individuals to be called before the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).162  As Richard 
Powers observed, “information derived from the [FBI’s] files was clearly 
the lifeblood of the Washington anti-communist establishment.”163  The 
FBI also leaked information about suspected individuals to employers and 
the press.164  Public accusations of being a Communist carried an immense 
stigma and often resulted in a severe public backlash.165  Individuals 
exposed as Communists faced retaliation in the private sector.  Numerous 
journalists, professors and entertainers were fired from their jobs and 
blacklisted from future employment.166 
 
 156. See GENTRY, supra note 118, at 93. 
 157. See POWERS, supra note 118, at 79–80. 
 158. See GENTRY, supra note 118, at 98–99. 
 159. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 
92–94 (1994). 
 160.  Id. at 10. 
 161. GENTRY, supra note 118, at 378–80, 402; POWERS, supra note 118, at 320–21. 
 162. See SCHRECKER, supra note 159, at 76–84.  For further background about the McCarthy era, 
see generally ALBERT FRIED, MCCARTHYISM: THE GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (1997) and RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 
(1990). 
 163. POWERS, supra note 118, at 321. 
 164. See SCHRECKER, supra note 159, at 77. 
 165. See Seth I. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and 
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–71 (1991). 
 166. SCHRECKER, supra note 159, at 76–84. 
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In short, government entities have demonstrated substantial abilities to 
gather and store personal information.  Combined with the extensive data 
available about individuals in third party records, this creates a recipe for 
similar or greater government abuses in the future. 
Fifth, unscrupulous government and law enforcement officials can 
abuse the availability of personal information databases.  Recently, a 
Michigan State Police official allegedly accessed the Law Enforcement 
Information Network (LEIN), a law enforcement database of personal 
information, to examine her ex-husband’s girlfriend’s background.167  The 
official was punished with a mere day’s suspension without pay.168  Prior 
to this incident, allegedly over ninety law enforcement officials had abused 
the LEIN during the past five years.169 
Sixth, information obtained by the government for one purpose can 
readily be used for another.  For example, the government may be 
investigating whether a prominent critic of the war against terrorism has in 
any way assisted terrorists or is engaged in terrorism.  In tracking an 
individual’s activities, the government does not discover any criminal 
activity with regard to terrorism, but discovers that a popular website for 
downloading music files has been visited and that copyright laws have been 
violated.170  Such information may ultimately be used to prosecute 
copyright violations as a pretext for the government’s distaste for the 
individual’s political views and beliefs.  Further, dossiers maintained by 
law enforcement organizations can be selectively leaked to attack critics.171 
Indeed, it is not far-fetched for government officials to amass data for 
use in silencing or attacking enemies, critics, undesirables, or radicals.  For 
example, J. Edgar Hoover accumulated an extensive collection of files with 
detailed information about the private lives of numerous prominent 
individuals, including presidents, members of Congress, Supreme Court 
 
 167. See M.L. Elrick, Cops Abuse Database, 3 Privacy Suits Say They Charge Officers Use LEIN 
to Check Out Personal Matters, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 25, 2001, at A1. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. For an excellent discussion of Napster and the impact of copyright law on music sharing, see 
generally Raymond Shih-Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002).  
 171. See JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: THE LOST 
BOUNDARIES OF THE SELF 97 (1979) (“Large-scale organizations tend to invade privacy . . .in order to 
use the information so gained as a private means to secure its public goals and in part by using managed 
leaks to reveal the private vices of their organizational and personal enemies.”). 
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justices, celebrities, civil rights leaders, and attorney generals.172  Hoover’s 
data often included sexual activities.173 
We live in a world of mixed and changing motives.  Data that is 
obtained for one purpose can be used for an entirely different purpose as 
motives change.  For example, for several years, the FBI extensively 
wiretapped Martin Luther King, Jr.174  They wiretapped his home, his 
office, and the hotel rooms that he stayed at when traveling.175  Based on 
the wiretaps, the FBI learned of his extensive partying, extramarital affairs, 
and other sexual activities.176  A high level FBI official even anonymously 
sent him a tape with highlights of the FBI’s recordings along with a letter 
that stated: 
King, there is only one thing left for you to do.  You know what it is.  
You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been 
selected for a specific reason, it has definite practical significant [sic]).  
You are done.  There is but one way out for you.  You better take it 
before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the nation.177 
Hoover’s motive is disputed.  One theory is that King was wiretapped 
because he was friendly with a person who had previously been a member 
of the Communist Party.178  Another theory is that Hoover despised King.  
Hoover’s longstanding hatred of King is evidenced by Hoover’s nasty 
public statements about King, such as calling King “the most notorious 
liar” in the nation.179  This was probably due, in part, to King’s criticism of 
the FBI for failing to address adequately the violence against blacks in the 
South, Hoover’s overreaction to any criticism of the FBI, and the FBI’s 
practice of consistently targeting its critics.180  As David Garrow 
hypothesizes, the original reason that the FBI began gathering information 
about King was due to fears of Communist ties; however, this motivation 
 
 172. CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY: PERSONAL RIGHTS IN THE SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY 160 (1999).  See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 163 (wiretapping of members of 
Congress and Supreme Court Justices); GENTRY, supra note 118 (providing detailed description of 
Hoover’s collection of files and extensive wiretapping). 
 173. See GARROW, supra note 117, at 165. 
 174. See, e.g., DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 140–42.  It was not until 1975, nearly a 
decade after the wiretapping and three years after Hoover’s death, that Congress conducted an inquiry 
into the wiretapping of King through the famous Church Committee.  See id. at 178. 
 175. GARROW, supra note 117, at 100–01. 
 176. See id. at 102 passim. 
 177. Id. at 126. 
 178. Id. at 26. 
 179. See id. at 78.  Hoover’s dislike of King may have also stemmed from racism.  It is well-
documented that Hoover was racist.  See id. at 153. 
 180. See id. at 79–83. 
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changed once these fears proved unfounded and several powerful 
individuals at the FBI expressed distaste for King’s sexual activities and 
moral behavior.181 
D.  PROTECTING PRIVACY WITH AN ARCHITECTURE OF POWER 
The dangers discussed above illustrate why privacy is integral to 
freedom in the modern state.  Privacy must be protected by establishing an 
architecture of power.  The word “architecture” emphasizes that the 
protection of privacy must be achieved through establishing a particular 
social structure that distributes power in our various relationships. 
Certain kinds of legal regulation can be readily analogized to 
architecture.  Typically, we view architecture as the design of buildings and 
edifices.  Buildings structure the way people feel and interact; they form 
and shape human relationships.182  Neal Kumar Katyal provides a 
fascinating account of how physical architecture—the way that 
neighborhoods and buildings are designed—can affect criminal 
behavior.183  Law resembles architecture in many respects, especially in the 
way that certain forms of regulation affect social practices. 
If we think of law as creating a structure, we can better understand the 
different forms that modern regulation must take to protect liberty in the 
modern state.  We have freedom not simply because we have rights.  Our 
liberty is constructed by various regulatory structures that regulate the 
safety of the products we buy, the conditions of the apartments we live in, 
the way that companies must interact with us, and the sanctity of the 
environment, among others.  An architecture of power protects a number of 
social practices of which privacy forms a significant part.  It protects 
 
 181. See id. at 151.  According to Garrow, the investigation and electronic surveillance of King in 
1962–63 began as an inquiry into King’s ties with Levison; in 1963–64, the investigation turned to an 
effort to discredit and attack King. 
 182. See generally THOMAS A. MARKUS, BUILDINGS AND POWER: FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN 
THE ORIGIN OF MODERN BUILDING TYPES (1993).  One of the most famous examples of the way 
architecture can affect social structure is the Panopticon, an architectural design for a prison developed 
by Jeremy Bentham.  According to this design, prison cells are arranged around a central observation 
tower, from which all cells are visible.  However, those in the cells cannot observe if anybody is in the 
tower.  The goal of this architecture is for each prisoner to believe that at any moment, she could be 
being watched, and this belief will result in increased obedience.  As Michel Foucault aptly noted, the 
Panopticon can be replicated in our society in ways not merely limited to physical architecture.  
Panoptic architecture can be part of the structure of social relationships.  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200–05 (Alan Sheridan Trans. 1977). 
 183. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1039 (2002). 
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privacy by providing a regulatory structure that shapes relationships and 
safeguards individual liberties. 
At the center of my view is the fact that privacy is an aspect of social 
practices, which involve relationships with other people and entities.184  
The need for privacy emerges from within a society, from the various social 
relationships that people form with each other, with private sector 
institutions, and with the government.  We do not need privacy on a 
deserted island; rather, the need for privacy is engendered by the existence 
of society, from the fact that we must live together. 
Relationships involve some balance of power between the parties.  
Power is not necessarily a zero-sum good, where more power to one party 
necessarily means less to another.  However, certain configurations of 
power in these relationships have profound effects on the scope and extent 
of freedom, democracy, equality, and other important values.  In the 
modern world, we are increasingly finding ourselves in a new type of 
relationship with public and private institutions.  These relationships are 
different because our institutions are more bureaucratic in nature.  
Bureaucracies use more information and often exercise power over people 
through the use of personal data.  Collecting and using personal 
information are having an intensifying influence on the effects of power in 
our social relationships.  Therefore, protecting privacy is critical to 
governing these relationships, and consequently, to regulating the tone and 
tenor of life in the Information Age. 
Protecting privacy through an architecture of power differs from 
protecting it as an individual right.  Privacy is often viewed as an individual 
right.185  It is seen as an individual possession, and its value is defined in 
terms of its worth to the individual.  This view is severely flawed.  John 
Dewey astutely critiqued the “conception of the individual as something 
given, complete in itself, and of liberty as a ready-made possession of the 
 
 184. For an extensive discussion of how privacy relates to social practices, see Solove, supra note 
17, at 1126–43. 
 185. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Fourth 
Amendment protection . . . is in essence a personal right.”); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–00 
(1977) (privacy is an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); Restatement 
(Second of Torts § 652(I) comment (a) (stating that “[t]he right protected by the action for invasion of 
privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded”); ELLEN ALDERMAN & 
CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY xv (1995) (noting that “privacy is, by definition, a 
personal right”); William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 253, 254 (1966) (observing that “[t]he right to privacy is an affirmation of the importance of 
certain aspects of the individual person and his desired freedom from unreasonable intrusive conduct by 
others”). 
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individual, only needing the removal of external restrictions in order to 
manifest itself.”186  According to Dewey, the individual is inextricably 
connected to society,187 and rights are not immutable possessions of 
individuals, but are instrumental in light of “the contribution they make to 
the welfare of the community.”188  The problem with viewing rights in 
purely individualistic terms is that it pits individual rights against the 
greater good of the community, with the interests of society often winning 
out because of their paramount importance when measured against one 
individual’s freedom. 
Viewing privacy as an individual right against government 
information-gathering conceives of the harm to privacy as emanating from 
the invasion into the lives of particular people.  But many of the people 
asserting a right to privacy against government information-gathering are 
criminals or terrorists, people we do not have a strong desire to protect.  In 
modern Fourth Amendment law, privacy protection is often initiated at the 
behest of specific individuals, typically those accused of crimes.  Often 
these individuals’ rights conflict with the need for effective law 
enforcement and the protection of society.  Why should one individual’s 
preference for privacy trump the social goals of security and safety?  This 
question is difficult to answer if privacy is understood as a right possessed 
by particular people. 
In contrast, an architecture of power protects privacy differently and is 
based on a different conception of privacy.  Privacy is not merely a right 
possessed by individuals, but is a form of freedom built into the social 
structure.  It is thus an issue about the common good as much as it is about 
individual rights.  It is an issue about social architecture, about the 
relationships that form the structure of our society. 
Government information-gathering is a central facet of our 
relationships to the government.  The increased stores of personal 
information in the hands of law enforcement officials pose a number of 
dangers, discussed in the previous section.  The abuses of government 
information-gathering chronicled earlier could be dismissed as those 
generated by the megalomania of a few rogue officials.  David Garrow has 
another theory, one that is more frightening.  According to Garrow, the FBI 
 
 186. John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, in 11 LATER WORKS 290 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. 
1991). 
 187. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 162–63 (1925); DEWEY, LIBERALISM 
AND SOCIAL ACTION 7 (1935). 
 188. John Dewey, Liberalism and Civil Liberties, in 11 LATER WORKS 374 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. 
1991). 
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that targeted Martin Luther King, Jr. was not a “deviant institution in 
American society, but actually a most representative and faithful one.”189  
In other words, the FBI reflected the mindset of many Americans 
embodying all the flaws of that mindset.  We like to blame individuals, and 
certainly the particular abusers are worthy of blame, but we cannot 
overlook the fact that the causes of abuse often run deeper than the corrupt 
official.  Abuse is made possible by a bureaucratic machinery that is readily 
susceptible to manipulation.  Thus, the problem lies in institutional 
structures and architectures of power.  In the latter half of the twentieth 
century, and continuing to the present, one of the aspects of this 
architecture has been the lack of control over government information-
gathering. 
 What is the most effective architecture of power to structure the way 
that the government can access personal information held by third parties?  
In the pages that follow, I discuss the two relevant architectures, that of the 
Fourth Amendment, which the Court has concluded does not apply to 
information held by third parties, and that of the statutory regime that has 
arisen in the void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment. 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, RECORDS, AND PRIVACY 
A.  THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
1.  The Purposes and Structure of the Fourth Amendment 
For better or for worse, we currently regulate law enforcement in the 
United States with a constitutional regulatory regime, comprised primarily 
by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.  A significant part of this 
regime applies to government information-gathering.  The Fifth 
Amendment affords individuals a privilege against being compelled to 
testify about incriminating information.190 The focus of this Part is the 
Fourth Amendment, which regulates the ability of the government to obtain 
information through searches and seizures.  The Fourth Amendment 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
 
 189. GARROW, supra note 117, at 209. 
 190. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
SOLO10.DOC 9/3/02  8:49 AM 
1118 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1083 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.191 
The Fourth Amendment contains two clauses, the first establishing the 
right to be secure in persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and the second stating the requirements 
for a valid warrant.  A long running debate in Fourth Amendment discourse 
concerns the relationship between the clauses.192 
Substantively, the Fourth Amendment’s focus has been on protecting 
privacy against certain government activities.  Procedurally, permissible 
exercises of government power are controlled through the process of 
obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause. 
The first and most important issue in Fourth Amendment analysis is 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the particular government 
action.  Although the Fourth Amendment applies to government activity in 
both the civil and criminal contexts,193 it is limited to activities that 
constitute “searches” and “seizures.”  Certain activities, such as seeing 
things in public, are not searches.194  Further, the Court has held that the 
Fourth Amendment only governs searches where an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.195 
Once the Fourth Amendment applies, a search or seizure must be 
“reasonable.”196  Although technically the two clauses of the Fourth 
Amendment are separate, the Court has interpreted the requirement that a 
search or seizure be reasonable as closely related to the requirement of a 
warrant.  Generally, searches and seizures without a warrant are per se 
unreasonable.197  This has become known as the “per se” warrant rule.198 
Even if the requirements for a valid warrant are established, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the search if it is unreasonable.199  However, the 
 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 192. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997); 
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389 (1989). 
 193. AMAR, supra note 192, at 9. 
 194. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (“It has long been settled that 
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are 
subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”). 
 195. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).  For a discussion of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, see infra Part III.A.2. 
 196. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 197. See AMAR, supra note 192, at 3–4. 
 198. See id.; Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1648 (1998); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 110, at 26–27. 
 199. See AMAR, supra note 192, at 16. 
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Court has rarely found that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant 
supported by probable cause was unreasonable.200  Unfortunately, as 
commentators have pointed out, when the Court has approached what is 
“reasonable,” it has failed to give “reasonable” any teeth.201  Therefore, if 
the government obtains a valid search warrant, in most cases the search or 
seizure is reasonable so long as it is properly within the scope of the 
warrant. 
To obtain a warrant, the police must demonstrate to a neutral judge or 
magistrate that they have “probable cause”—”where ‘the facts and 
circumstances within [the police’s] knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 
or is being committed.”202 
Despite the Court’s pronouncement in Katz in 1967 that there are only 
“a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the 
warrant requirement,203 in the decades following Katz, the Court has made 
numerous exceptions.204  For example, the Court held in Terry v. Ohio205 
that the police could stop and frisk an individual without a warrant or 
probable cause.  Further, the Court has held that “special needs” in the 
contexts of schools and workplaces make the warrant and probable cause 
requirements impracticable.206  In the words of Silas Wasserstrom and 
 
 200. The most famous example is Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), where the Court held that 
a surgical incision to remove a bullet from the suspect’s body to provide evidence was unreasonable, 
warrant notwithstanding.  However, the Court has sustained a number of other bodily intrusions to 
obtain evidence, such as the withdrawal of blood to test for blood alcohol level.  See Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 757 (1966). 
 201. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 198, at 1645, 1687–88 (1998) (pointing out the lack of teeth in the 
Court’s current Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing and proposing that the Court “recognize 
that an ‘unreasonable’ search in violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the intrusiveness 
of a search outweighs the gravity of the offense being investigated”); Tracey Maclin, Constructing 
Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 719 (1988). 
 202. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
 203. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 204. See AMAR, supra note 192, at 3–4; Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth 
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (1991). 
 205. 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968).  See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding 
that although health, fire, and safety inspectors could not enter a home without a warrant, they need not 
demonstrate probable cause to obtain the warrant).  For a critique of Terry and Camara, see Scott E. 
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. 
L. REV. 383 (1988). 
 206. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (drug testing by school 
officials); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rabb, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of Customs 
officials); Skinner v. Ry Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of railroad 
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Louis Michael Seidman, the per se warrant rule “is so riddled with 
exceptions, complexities, and contradictions that it has become a trap for 
the unwary.”207 
Currently, the Amendment is enforced primarily through the 
exclusionary rule208 and, to a lesser degree, through civil liability in § 1983 
actions.209  In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,210 the Court held that in all criminal 
proceedings, both federal and state, evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment must be excluded from the defendant’s criminal 
trial.211  According to Arnold Loewy: “The exclusionary rule protects 
innocent people by eliminating the incentive to search and seize 
unreasonably.”212  Without the exclusionary rule, Justice Holmes observed, 
the Fourth Amendment would be a mere “form of words.”213  The 
exclusionary rule, however, has long been a sore spot in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, engendering an extensive debate over its 
desirability and efficacy.214 
 
employees); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search by government employer); New Jersey 
v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search by school officials). 
 207. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 119, at 34. 
 208. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to all 
government searches, state and federal). 
 209. Liability under § 1983 has been severely limited due to qualified immunity for police 
officers, see generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), as well as the lack of direct liability 
for states.  See generally Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  Municipalities and local governments 
can be sued, but they are only liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether 
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly represent official policy inflicts the 
injury.”  Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978). 
 210. 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961). 
 211. Prior to Mapp, the Court held that the exclusionary rule only applied to evidence improperly 
obtained by federal officials in federal court.  See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).  In 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to state 
officials.  In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court began to reverse course, holding 
that evidence seized by state police in violation of Fourth Amendment is excluded in federal court.  For 
more background about the development of the exclusionary rule, see Potter Stewart, The Road to 
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search 
and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983). 
 212. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. 
L. REV. 1229, 1266 (1983). 
 213. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
 214. Several commentators have criticized the exclusionary rule, advocating a system of civil 
damages rather than the exclusion of inculpatory evidence.  See AMAR, supra note 192, at 28 ([the 
criminal defendant is] an awkward champion of the Fourth Amendment. . . . He is often 
unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding citizens, and his interests regularly conflict with 
theirs.”); Id. at 20–21 (suggesting tort remedies); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the 
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 400–01 (1999) (arguing for a damages remedy because 
the exclusionary rule fails to provide an adequate remedy to innocent people whose Fourth Amendment 
rights are violated and because the rule results in judicial reluctance to expand Fourth Amendment 
protection).  Other commentators argue that civil damages will prove to be much less successful than 
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2.  Fourth Amendment Scope: Privacy 
As applied by the Court, the Fourth Amendment has focused on 
protecting against invasions of privacy,215 although some commentators 
contend this focus is misguided.  According to William Stuntz, criminal 
procedure is “firmly anchored in a privacy value that had already proved 
inconsistent with the modern state.”216  For Stuntz, privacy vis-à-vis the 
government is impracticable given the rise of the administrative state, with 
its extensive health and welfare regulation.  Stuntz asserts that robust 
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy will prevent the government from 
regulating industry, uncovering white-collar crime, and inspecting industry 
facilities.  The government must collect information to enforce certain 
regulations, such as securities laws, and worker safety protections.217  “By 
focusing on privacy,” Stuntz argues, “Fourth Amendment law has largely 
abandoned the due process cases concern with coercion and violence.”218 
“The problem,” argues Stuntz, “is not information gathering but [police] 
violence.”219 
Scott Sundby offers a different critique of the Fourth Amendment’s 
focus on privacy.  Privacy, although “meant to liberate the [Fourth] 
Amendment from wooden categorizations . . . [, has] turned out to contain 
the seeds for the later contraction of Fourth Amendment rights.”220  “The 
Fourth Amendment as a privacy-focused doctrine has not fared well with 
the changing times of an increasingly nonprivate world and a judicial 
reluctance to expand individual rights.”221  The Fourth Amendment should 
be redefined as promoting “‘trust’ between the government and the 
citizenry.”222  In contrast to totalitarian states, where the government 
 
the exclusionary rule.  See Loewy, supra note 212, at 1266 (arguing that under a damages regime, if the 
government really wants to search, it will conduct the illegal search and pay the damages); Maclin, 
supra note, 130 at 62 (contending that juries sympathize with the police in civil suits to enforce the 
Fourth Amendment and that damages are hard to prove). 
 215. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 1016, 1019 (1995). 
 216. Stuntz, supra note 119, at 442. 
 217. See Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1019. 
 218. Stuntz, supra note 119, at 446.  See also Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1044 (“Coercion becomes 
the law’s focus only in . . . the most extreme cases.  Elsewhere, the law’s chief concern remains 
privacy”). 
 219. Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1077. 
 220. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between 
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1757–58 (1994). 
 221. Id. at 1771. 
 222. Id. at 1777. 
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demonstrates a profound distrust of the people, the government should 
“trust that the citizenry will exercise its liberties responsibly.”223 
However, Sundby assumes that “privacy” means what the Court says 
it means.  Many current problems in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
stem from the Court’s failure to conceptualize privacy adequately, both in 
method and substance.  Methodologically, the Court has attempted to 
adhere to a unified conception of privacy.  Conceptualizing privacy by 
attempting to isolate its essence or common denominator has inhibited the 
Court from conceptualizing privacy in a way that can adapt to changing 
technology and social practices.224  Consider that, substantively, the Court 
originally conceptualized privacy in physical terms as protecting tangible 
property or preventing trespasses225 and that after Katz, the Court shifted to 
viewing privacy as a form of total secrecy.226  In each of these conceptual 
paradigms, the Court has rigidly adhered to a single narrow conception and 
has lost sight of the Fourth Amendment’s larger purposes. 
 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment provides for an architecture of 
power, a structure of protection that safeguards a range of different social 
practices of which privacy forms an integral dimension.  Those like Stuntz 
and Sundby who contend that the Fourth Amendment should not concern 
itself with privacy fail to see the importance of privacy in the relationship 
between the government and the people.  The private life is a critical point 
for the exercise of power.  Privacy involves aspects of our lives and social 
practices where people feel vulnerable, uneasy, and fragile.  It involves 
aspects where the norms of social judgment are particularly abrasive and 
oppressive.  It is also implicated where information relates to issues of our 
most basic needs and desires: finances, employment, entertainment, 
political activity, sexuality, and family.  The private life is an area of 
profound sensitivity.  Control over the private life is one of the central 
techniques of government power in totalitarian states.  Indeed, the great 
distopian novels of the twentieth century—George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and Franz Kafka’s The 
Trial, illustrate how government exercises of power over the private life 
stifle freedom and well-being.227 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1146–47. 
 225. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 226. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 227. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa & 
Edwin Muir, et. al., trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1956) (1937); ORWELL, supra note 96. 
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Although Stuntz contends that the Fourth Amendment must turn away 
from privacy after the rise of the administrative state, this is the very reason 
why it is so important to protect privacy.  The rise of the administrative 
state threatens to give the government excessive power that could destroy 
the Framer’s careful design to ensure that the power of the People remains 
the strongest.228  In particular, the extensive power of modern 
bureaucracies over individuals depends in significant part on the collection 
and use of personal information.  While Stuntz is correct that the Fourth 
Amendment should not be cabined exclusively to protecting privacy and 
should address other values, such as coercion and violence, he errs in 
treating privacy and police coercion as mutually exclusive.229 
 Further, robust Fourth Amendment protection  need not be 
inconsistent with the administrative state, as a significant portion of modern 
administrative regulation concerns business and commercial activities 
which lack Fourth Amendment rights equivalent to those guaranteed to 
individuals.230  Stuntz retorts that for individuals to have a meaningful 
protection of privacy, they must have privacy within institutions, and 
giving privacy rights to individuals within institutions “is almost the same 
as giving the institution itself a protectible privacy interest.”231  Further, 
Stuntz contends, “a great deal of government information gathering targets 
individuals,” such as the information that is gathered in tax forms.232  
However, one need not adopt an all-or-nothing approach to Fourth 
Amendment privacy.  The Fourth Amendment does not categorically 
prohibit the government from compelling certain disclosures by individuals 
or institutions.  If it did, then a significant amount of corporate regulation 
and the tax system would be nearly impossible to carry out.  But the fact 
that the government can compel certain disclosures does not mean that it 
 
 228. Raymond Shih-Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of 
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1340  (2002) (examining connection between the 
Fourth Amendment to separation of powers). 
 229. See Daniel Yeager, Does Privacy Really Have a Problem in the Law of Criminal 
Procedure?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1283, 1309–10 (1997) (agreeing with Stuntz that regulatory 
inspections can be more invasive of privacy than regular searches, but disagrees that “encounterless 
police investigations should be more loosely controlled so they are better aligned with regulatory 
inspections”).  Louis Michael Seidman disputes Stuntz’s view that the Fourth Amendment places 
privacy above coercion.  See generally Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy’s Problem, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 1079 (1995). 
 230. Although corporations are deemed “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Santa 
Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 394–95 (1886), they are not afforded Fourth Amendment 
rights.  See California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974) (stating that “corporations can 
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy”). 
 231. Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1037. 
 232. Id. 
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can compel people to disclose the details of their sexual lives or require 
them to send in their diaries and personal papers along with their tax forms.  
Further, the fact that the government can inspect factories for safety 
violations and food processing facilities for health violations does not mean 
that the government should be able to search every employee’s office, 
locker, or bag.  Therefore, although misconceptualizing privacy, the Court 
has correctly made it a focal point of the Fourth Amendment. 
3.  Fourth Amendment Structure: Warrants 
Before eroding it with dozens of exceptions, the Court made the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement one of the central mechanisms 
to ensure that the government was exercising its powers of information 
gathering responsibly.  Some critics, however, view warrants as relatively 
unimportant in the Fourth Amendment scheme, as something to be 
restricted rather than expanded.  According to Akhil Amar, the Fourth 
Amendment “does not require, presuppose, or even prefer warrants—it 
limits them.  Unless warrants meet certain strict standards, they are per se 
unreasonable.”233  Amar contends that the colonial revolutionaries viewed 
warrants with disdain because judges were highly influenced by the Crown 
and warrants immunized government officials from civil liability after 
conducting a search.234  Therefore, according to Amar, “[t]he core of the 
Fourth Amendment, as we have seen, is neither a warrant nor probable 
cause, but reasonableness.”235 
Amar is too dismissive of warrants.  Merely looking to colonial 
precedents is insufficient, because the Fourth Amendment did not follow 
colonial precedents (since general searches were rampant) but 
“repudiate[d] them.”236  My aim, however, is not to quarrel about original 
intent, as it remains unclear whether the per se warrant rule follows the 
Framers’ intent.  Even if Amar is right about the Framers’ intent, warrants 
are an important device in our times since, as Scott Sundby observes, “the 
Founders could not have foreseen the technological and regulatory reach of 
government intrusions that exists today.”237 
The warrant requirement embodies two important insights of the 
Framers that particularly hold true today.  First, the warrant requirement 
 
 233. AMAR, supra note 192, at 11. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Id. at 31. 
 236. LEVY, supra note 130, at 154. 
 237. Sundby, supra note 220, at 1804. 
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aims to prevent searches from turning into “fishing expeditions.”238  
Accordingly, the warrant clause circumscribes searches and seizures.  A 
warrant must describe with “particular[ity] . . . the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.”239 
The Framers included the warrant clause because of their experience 
with general warrants and writs of assistance.240  The colonists despised 
writs of assistance because they authorized “sweeping searches and 
seizures without any evidentiary basis.”241  The Fourth Amendment was 
inspired by the use of general warrants by Britain, which “resulted in 
‘ransacking’ and seizure of the personal papers of political dissenters, 
authors, and printers of seditious libel.”242  As Patrick Henry declared: 
“They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, 
or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, 
ransack, and measure, everything you eat, drink, and wear.  They ought to 
be restrained within proper bounds.”243 
Second, warrants reflect James Madison’s vision of the appropriate 
architecture of power for a society in which the power of the people 
remains paramount.  Writing about separation of powers in Federalist No. 
51, Madison observed: 
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature?  If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on 
government would be necessary.  In framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You 
must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the 
next place, oblige it to controul itself.  A dependence on the people is no 
doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.244 
 
 238. Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107, 115 (1986) (“The 
spirit and letter of the fourth amendment counseled against the belief that Congress intended to 
authorize a ‘fishing expedition’ into private papers on the possibility that they might disclose a crime.”). 
 239. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 240. Maclin, supra note 130, at 8.  Indeed, as Maclin notes: “Everyone, including Amar, agrees 
that the Framers opposed general warrants.”  Id. at 9.  See also LEVY, supra note 130, at 158. 
 241. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 119, at 82. 
 242. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (Prager Publishers 1979).  See 
also LEVY, supra note 130, at 150; Stuntz, supra note 119, at 406. 
 243. 3 THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 448–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1974). 
 244. James Madison, The Federalist, No. 51, in THE FEDERALIST 347, 349 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
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The profound insight of Madison and the Framers was that by 
separating government powers between different entities and pitting them 
against each other, government could be controlled.  Madison was acutely 
aware that the “parchment barriers” of the Constitution would fail to check 
government encroachments of power, and he explained how both the 
legislative and executive branches could overstep their bounds.245  He 
therefore reasoned that government power should be constrained through 
governmental architecture, not mere restrictive words.246  As Madison put 
it, power should be diffused among different departments of government, 
each of which should be given “the necessary constitutional means, and 
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others,”247 because 
government will be kept in check only if its parts consist of “opposite and 
rival interests.”248  Gordon Wood aptly described the Madisonian vision: 
It was an imposing conception—a kinetic theory of politics—such a 
crumbling of political and social interests, such an atomization of 
authority, such a parceling of power, not only in the governmental 
institutions but in the extended sphere of the society itself, creating such 
a multiplicity and a scattering of designs and passions, so many checks, 
that no combination of parts could hold, no group of evil interests could 
long cohere.  Yet out of the clashing and checking of this diversity, 
Madison believed the public good, the true perfection of the whole, 
would somehow arise.249 
The warrant requirement reflects Madison’s philosophy of 
government power by inserting the judicial branch in the middle of the 
executive branch’s investigation process.250  Although warrants have been 
criticized as ineffective because judges and magistrates often defer to the 
police and prosecutor’s determination, Christopher Slobogin aptly contends 
that warrants raise the “standard of care” of law enforcement officials by 
forcing them to “document their requests for authorization.”251  According 
to Stuntz, warrants make searching more expensive, because they require 
law enforcement officials to “draft affidavits and wait around 
 
 245. James Madison, The Federalist, No. 48, supra note 244, at 333 (James Madison). 
 246. Madison, supra note 244, at 347 (James Madison). 
 247. Id. at 349. 
 248. Id. 
 249. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 605 (Univ. of 
North Carolina Press 1969). 
 250. Madison drafted the language of the Fourth Amendment.  See Fisher, supra note 238, at 111–
12.  As Levy observes, “Madison chose the maximum protection conceivable at the time.”  LEVY, supra 
note 130, at 176. 
 251. Slobogin, supra note 204, at 17. 
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courthouses.”252  Because officers must devote time to obtaining a warrant, 
they are unlikely to use them unless they think it is likely that they will find 
what they are looking for.253  As Justice Douglas has explained for the 
Court: 
We are not dealing with formalities.  The presence of a search warrant 
serves a high function.  Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth 
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the 
police.  This was done neither to shield criminals nor to make the home a 
safe haven for illegal activities.  It was done so that an objective mind 
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.  
The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion 
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.  
Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their 
own cannot be trusted.  And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to 
pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the 
home.254 
Further, the requirement of prior approval prevents government 
officials from “dreaming up post hoc rationalizations”255 and from 
experiencing judicial hindsight bias when evaluating the propriety of a 
search after it has taken place.256  As Raymond Ku aptly observes, the 
Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment based on concerns about limiting 
executive power.257 
My purpose is not to defend the existing structure of the Fourth 
Amendment as perfect.  For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to 
agree (1) that the Fourth Amendment regime serves an important function 
by establishing an architecture of power that aims to protect privacy in 
addition to other values, and (2) that one of the central features of this 
architecture requires neutral and external oversight of the executive 
branch’s power to gather and use personal information. 
 
 252. William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 848 (2001). 
 253. See id. at 848. 
 254. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948).  See also Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (warrants are necessary because law enforcement officials “may lack 
sufficient objectivity”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) (stating that 
“prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to 
their own investigations”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment ensures that inferences of potential culpability “be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime”). 
 255. AMAR, supra note 192, at 39. 
 256. See Steiker, supra note 121, at 853. 
 257. Ku, The Founders’ Privacy, supra note 228, at 1333–40. 
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Even if its efficacy is limited, the structure of the Fourth Amendment 
is better than a void.  Few commentators have suggested that the Fourth 
Amendment be repealed or that its larger purposes in controlling 
government power are inimical to a well-functioning society.  Outside the 
realm of the Fourth Amendment is a great wilderness, a jungle of 
government discretion and uncontrolled power.  Thus, the issue of the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment is an important one, and to that 
issue I now turn. 
B.  THE SHIFTING PARADIGMS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY 
Some notion of privacy was always the trigger for Fourth Amendment 
protection, at least since the late nineteenth century.  In 1886, in Boyd v. 
United States,258 an early case delineating the meaning of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments,259 the government attempted to subpoena the records of 
a merchant for use in a civil forfeiture proceeding.260  The Court held that 
the subpoena violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: 
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, 
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private 
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of 
some public offence . . . .261 
Commentators have characterized Boyd as protecting property and as 
consistent with the exaltation of property and contract during the Lochner-
era.262  Although Boyd certainly furthers the ideology of the Lochner Court, 
it should not merely be dismissed as the product of Lochner-like activism.  
Boyd follows a conception of privacy that the Court consistently adhered to 
in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.  
Under this conception, the Court views invasions of privacy as a type of 
physical injury involving incursions into tangible things. 
 
 258. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 259. The Fifth Amendment provides that: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment’s  “privilege 
against self-incrimination” prevents the government from compelling individuals to disclose 
inculpatory information about themselves.  Id. 
 260. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–18. 
 261. Id. at 630. 
 262. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 192, at 22 (explaining that Boyd was part of the Lochner Court’s 
staunch protection of property); O’BRIEN, supra note 242, at 22 (explaining that Boyd associated 
privacy with “proprietary interests”); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 339–41 (1967) 
(describing the conception of privacy in Boyd as “propertied privacy”); Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1030–
34 (describing Boyd as part of Lochner Court’s impediment to the rise of the administrative state). 
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 The protection of tangible things extended beyond the home, 
encompassing the opening of letters sent via the postal system.  Nine years 
prior to Boyd, the Court recognized in 1877, in Ex Parte Jackson,263 that 
“[t]he constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their 
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, 
thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”264  Additionally, 
privacy also concerned physical bodily intrusions.  In Union Pacific 
Railway Company v. Botsford,265 an 1891 case concerning privacy but not 
directly involving the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that a court could 
not compel a female plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical 
examination: 
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory 
stripping and exposure as by a blow.  To compel any one, and especially 
a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, 
without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a 
trespass . . . .266 
Consistent with Boyd and Ex Parte Jackson, the Court readily 
recognized the injury caused by physical intrusions such as trespassing into 
homes, rummaging through one’s things, seizing one’s papers, opening and 
examining one’s letters, or physically touching one’s body.  Indeed, in 
1890, when Warren and Brandeis authored their famous article The Right 
to Privacy, they observed that the law, which had long recognized physical 
and tangible injuries, was just beginning to recognize incorporeal ones.267  
Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy was more than simply a physical 
intrusion,268 a view increasingly recognized in the common law of torts in 
the early twentieth century.269  However, in its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court held fast to its physical intrusion conception of 
privacy. 
The Court’s view that Fourth Amendment privacy constituted 
protection from physical intrusions came to a head in 1928 in Olmstead v. 
United States.270  There, the Court held that the tapping of a person’s home 
 
 263. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
 264. Id. at 733. 
 265. 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
 266. Id. at 252. 
 267. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193–95 
(1890). 
 268. See id. at 195–97. 
 269. See Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 
CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1990). 
 270. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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telephone outside a person’s house did not run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment because it did not involve a trespass inside a person’s home.  
More specifically, it held that “[t]he Amendment does not forbid what was 
done here.  There was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence 
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was no 
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”271  Olmstead relied upon 
the Court’s physical intrusion conception of privacy.  Since there was no 
trespassing, opening, or rummaging, there was no invasion of Fourth 
Amendment privacy. 
Justice Louis Brandeis vigorously dissented, chastising the Court for 
failing to adapt the Constitution to new problems.  He observed: “When the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, the form that evil had 
theretofore taken had been necessarily simple.”272  Furthermore, “[the 
government] could secure possession of [a person’s] papers and other 
articles incident to his private life—a seizure effected, if need be, by 
breaking and entry.”273  Brandeis argued that the Fourth Amendment was 
designed to regulate this conduct—that 
‘time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes.’  Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy 
have become available to the government.  Discovery and invention have 
made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than 
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet.274 
The Court, however, followed the Olmstead conception of privacy in 
Goldman v. United States.275  The police placed a device called a 
“detectaphone” on the wall next to a person’s office enabling them to 
eavesdrop on the conversations inside the office.276  The Court concluded 
that since there had been no physical trespass into the office, the Fourth 
Amendment had not been violated.277 
In 1967, nearly forty years after Olmstead, the Court in Katz v. United 
States278 finally abandoned the physical intrusion conception of privacy, 
and adopted the Fourth Amendment approach employed today.  Katz 
involved the wiretapping of a telephone conversation made by the 
 
 271. Id. at 464. 
 272. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 473. 
 275. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See id. at 134. 
 278. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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defendant while in a phone booth.  Explicitly overruling Olmstead and 
Goldman, the Court declared: “What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in 
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”279 
The Court’s approach to determining the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment emerged from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz.  The 
“reasonable expectation of privacy test” looks to whether (1) a person 
exhibits an “actual or subjective expectation of privacy” and (2) “the 
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”280 
Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead only partially won the day in Katz.  
Instead of adopting a conception of privacy that was adaptable to 
technology, as the new reasonable expectation of privacy test initially had 
promised to be, the Court rigidified its approach with a particular 
conception of privacy—total secrecy.  The Court centered this new 
conception on the language in Katz, indicating that privacy turned on what 
a person exposed to the public.  In this way, privacy was conceptualized as 
a form of secrecy, and one could not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information that was not kept secret. 
The full implications of this new conception of privacy are discussed 
in the next section.  Before turning to this issue, it is important to observe 
the effects of the Court’s failure to conceptualize privacy in Olmstead.  As 
a result of the nearly forty years between Olmstead and Katz, there has 
been little control over the burgeoning use of electronic surveillance.  
Electronic surveillance, one of the most powerful technological law 
enforcement tools developed during the twentieth century, has profoundly 
increased the government’s powers.  The Fourth Amendment, however, has 
stood by silently as this new technology has developed. 
At the time of Olmstead, many viewed wiretapping with great unease.  
Justice Holmes called it a “dirty business.”281  Even those who became its 
greatest abusers had initially criticized it.  J. Edgar Hoover testified in 1929 
that “while it may not be illegal . . . [wiretapping] is unethical and it is not 
 
 279. Id. at 351–52. 
 280. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 281. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  See also RICHARD F. HIXSON, 
PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 49 (1987).  For a history of the early days 
of wiretapping, see Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892 
(1981). 
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permitted under the regulations by the Attorney General.”282  Hoover stated 
that “any employee engaged in wire tapping will be dismissed from the 
service of the bureau.”283 
In 1934, just six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted § 605 of the 
Federal Communications Act, making wiretapping a federal crime.   
However, § 605 had significant limitations.  It did not apply to wiretapping 
by state law enforcement officials or by private parties.  Nor did it apply to 
bugging.  Further, federal law enforcement officials interpreted § 605 
merely to preclude the disclosure rather than the collection of intercepted 
communications.284  The Supreme Court, however, held that § 605 
precluded evidence obtained by wiretapping from being used in court.285  
Although law enforcement officials could not use wiretapping evidence or 
its fruits, § 605 failed to prevent them from installing devices and 
listening.286 
Gradually, presidents gave the FBI increasing authority to wiretap.287  
In World War II, the FBI was authorized to engage in wiretapping to 
investigate threats to national security.  Later, the authorization for 
wiretapping expanded to encompass domestic security.  The fear of 
communism during the 1950s resulted in further increases in the use of 
electronic surveillance.288 
As fears of Communism escalated and the authority to engage in 
electronic surveillance increased, widespread abuses began to occur.  
Hoover substantially abused his wiretapping authority by extensively 
wiretapping FBI critics, individuals whose views he disliked, and the 
enemies of his political allies.289  As discussed earlier, he engaged in 
massive electronic surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr.290  Presidents 
also used the wiretapping power of the FBI for their own political purposes 
and for domestic surveillance.  President Nixon ordered extensive 
wiretapping, including surveillance of his own speechwriter, William 
 
 282. Fisher, supra note 238, at 127. 
 283. Id. 
 284. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 158 (2000). 
 285. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence directly obtained by 
wiretapping excluded from evidence); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (evidence 
obtained as the fruit of illegal wiretapping could not be used in court). 
 286. See SMITH, supra note 284, at 160. 
 287. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 155–65. 
 288. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 161–62. 
 289. See supra Part II.C. 
 290. See supra Part II.C. 
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Safire.291  Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have also been accused of 
ordering electronic surveillances for improper purposes.292  With regard to 
pre-Katz wiretapping by the states, an influential study led by Samuel Dash 
concluded that 90% of state wiretapping had been done without court 
authorization and that state regulation of wiretapping had been largely 
ineffective and impotent against abuses.293 
Thus, for forty years, the government’s power to engage in electronic 
surveillance has fallen outside of the reach of the Fourth Amendment, and 
the legislation that has filled the void has been ineffective.  Today, history 
is in the process of repeating itself.  The Court has made a mistake similar to 
the one the Olmstead Court made, and it is one with severe and far-reaching 
implications. 
C.  THE NEW OLMSTEAD 
Although we have moved from the Boyd and Olmstead world of 
physical papers and places to a new regime based upon expectations of 
privacy, there is a new Olmstead, one that is just as shortsighted and rigid 
in approach.  The Court’s new conception of privacy is one of total secrecy.  
If any information is exposed to the public or if law enforcement officials 
can view something from any public vantage point, then the Court has 
refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
For example, in Florida v. Riley,294 the Court held that a person did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his enclosed greenhouse 
because a few roof panels were missing and the police were able to fly over 
it with a helicopter.295  In California v. Greenwood,296 the police searched 
plastic garbage bags that the defendant had left on the curb to be collected 
by the trash collector.  The Court held that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the trash because “[i]t is common knowledge that 
plastic bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to 
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”297  
The Court also reasoned that the trash was left at the curb “for the express 
purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might 
 
 291. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 128, at 144. 
 292. Id. at 173. 
 293. SAMUEL DASH, RICHARD SCHWARTZ, & ROBERT KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959). 
 294. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 295. See id. at 451–52. 
 296. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 297. Id. at 40. 
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himself have sorted through [the] trash or permitted others, such as the 
police, to do so.”298 
Consistent with this conception of privacy, the Court held that there is 
no reasonable expectation in privacy for information known or exposed to 
third parties.  In United States v. Miller,299 federal agents presented 
subpoenas to two banks to produce all of the financial records of the 
defendant.  The banks produced the records but did not notify the defendant 
of the subpoenas.  The defendant challenged the subpoenas as a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  The Court held that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in financial records maintained by a bank.300  “[T]he 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed 
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”301  The 
Court reasoned: “The checks are not confidential communications but 
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.  All of the 
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, 
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to 
their employees in the ordinary course of business.”302 
In Smith v. Maryland, police officers were attempting to track down a 
robber who had begun making obscene and harassing phone calls.303  At 
one point, the robber asked someone he had been calling to step out on her 
front porch, where she observed him drive by in his car.304  The police 
traced the license plate number and found that the car was registered to the 
defendant.305  Without a warrant, the police asked the telephone company 
to install a pen register to record the numbers dialed from the defendant’s 
home.306  The Court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in pen registers.307  Since people “know that they must convey 
numerical information to the phone company” and that the phone company 
records this information for billing purposes, people cannot “harbor any 
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”308 
 
 298. Id. 
 299. 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976). 
 300. Id. at 444. 
 301. Id. at 443. 
 302. Id. at 442. 
 303. 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id.  A pen register is a device that is typically installed at the telephone company’s offices 
that can record the telephone numbers a person dials.  A trap and trace device is a similar device that 
can record the telephone numbers of a person’s incoming telephone traffic. 
 307. Id. at 743. 
 308. Id. 
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Miller and Smith establish a general rule that if information is in the 
hands of third parties, then an individual can have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that information, which means that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply.309  Individuals thus probably do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in communications and records 
maintained by ISPs or computer network system administrators.310 
Two lines of cases support the third party doctrine.  The first deals 
with standing and the second deals with assumption of risk.  The Court’s 
modern standing doctrine emerges primarily from two cases, Rakas v. 
Illinois311 and Rawlings v. Kentucky.312 
In Rakas, the police seized evidence from the glove compartment of 
an automobile with several passengers.  The passengers moved to suppress 
the seized evidence under the Fourth Amendment, but the Court held that 
they had no standing to do so because they did not own the car and because 
they claimed that they did not own the evidence in the glove compartment.  
Said the Court, “[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and 
seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a 
search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his 
Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”313 
In Rawlings, a police officer ordered the defendant’s girlfriend to 
empty the contents of her purse.  Among the contents of the purse were 
drugs that the defendant admitted belonged to him.  The Court rejected the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge because he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy once he entrusted the items to a third party.314 
In addition to the standing doctrine, both Miller and Smith analogized 
to a series of cases involving the assumption of risk doctrine.  In Miller, the 
Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment does not “prohibit the obtaining 
of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”315  In Smith, the 
 
 309. See ORIN S. KERR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND 
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS § I.B.3 (Jan. 2001). 
 310. Id. at § I.C.1(b)(iv). 
 311. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 312. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
 313. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134. 
 314. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104–06. 
 315. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
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Court stated that the defendant had “assumed the risk that the [phone] 
company would reveal to the police the numbers he [had] dialed.”316 
The assumption of risk doctrine emerged from a series of cases 
dealing with informants and undercover agents.  In these cases, either a 
person had revealed information to a friend, who later divulged the 
information to the police, or a person revealed the information to a police 
informant or undercover officer.317  For example, in Hoffa v. United 
States,318 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply where 
the defendant made statements to an undercover informant while in his 
hotel room.319  The Court reasoned that the undercover informant was “not 
a surreptitious eavesdropper” but was invited in and trusted by the 
defendant, who had relied “upon his misplaced confidence that [the 
informant] would not reveal his wrongdoing.”320  In Lewis v. United 
States,321 the defendant sold drugs to an undercover agent, and the Court 
held that he had assumed the risk of betrayal.322  Likewise, in Lee v. United 
States,323 the Court relied upon the assumption of risk doctrine to reject the 
claim of a defendant who had revealed information to an informant who 
was using a concealed transmitter that enabled the police to listen to the 
conversation.324 
The third party record doctrine, buttressed by the standing and 
assumption of risk doctrines, stems from a particular conception of privacy 
that views Fourth Amendment privacy as constituting a form of total 
secrecy.325  Under this conception, privacy is a form of concealment, where 
secrets are inaccessible to others.  If information is not secret in this way, if 
it is in any way exposed to others, then it loses its status as private. 
Further, the Court views privacy as an individual right.  Fourth 
Amendment privacy is enforced at the behest of particular individuals via 
the exclusionary rule.  The problem with the Court’s current conception of 
privacy is that it views the Fourth Amendment as protecting rights 
 
 316. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 317. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (reasoning that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect information conveyed to a government informant who wears a radio 
transmitter); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (stating that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply when a person misplaces her trust by talking to a bugged government informant). 
 318. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 319. Id. at 302. 
 320. Id. 
 321. 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 322. Id. at 210–11. 
 323. 343 U.S. at 747. 
 324. Id. at 751–52. 
 325. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1435. 
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possessed by individuals seeking to suppress evidence.  According to Mary 
Coombs, the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has applied too 
much of an “individualistic conception of privacy” and has ignored privacy 
as shared among groups of individuals.326  Since the Fourth Amendment 
establishes an architecture of power, its protection should not turn on 
whether an individual possesses the right.  Rather the Amendment protects 
rights by establishing a particular social structure, one that benefits society 
by restricting government power.  If we most want to protect innocent 
parties, the Court’s standing doctrine thwarts this very goal.327 
Dissenting in Rakas, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens 
observed that the Court’s ruling “undercuts the force of the exclusionary 
rule in the one area in which its use is most certainly justified—the 
deterrence of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment.”328  In 
particular, the Justices observed: 
This decision invites police to engage in patently unreasonable searches 
every time an automobile contains more than one occupant.  Should 
something be found, only the owner of the vehicle, or of the item, will 
have standing to seek suppression, and the evidence will presumably be 
usable against the other occupants.329 
Smith and Miller have been extensively criticized throughout the past 
several decades.  However, it is only recently that we are truly beginning to 
see the profound implications of the Court’s third party doctrine.  Smith and 
Miller are the new Olmstead and Goldman.  Gathering information from 
third party records is an emerging law enforcement practice with as many 
potential dangers as the wiretapping in Olmstead.  “The progress of science 
in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop 
with wiretapping,” Justice Brandeis observed in his Olmstead dissent.330  
“Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without 
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by 
 
 326. Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 
75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (1987).  See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 367 (1974) (critiquing standing doctrine for viewing Fourth 
Amendment protections as protecting “atomistic spheres of interest of individual citizens” rather than as 
“regulation of governmental conduct”). 
 327. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 326, at 1600 (stating that if the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule is deterrence, then it should apply regardless of standing); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 
119, at 97 (same). 
 328. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 168 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). 
 329. Id. at 168–69. 
 330. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences 
of the home.”331 
That day is here.  Government information gathering from the 
extensive dossiers being assembled with modern computer technology 
poses one of the most significant threats to privacy of our times.  In the 
void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment, Congress has 
erected a statutory regime of protection, which establishes the current 
architecture of power for government information gathering from third 
party records.  Unfortunately, this regime is woefully inadequate. 
IV.  THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF POWER: THE EMERGING 
STATUTORY REGIME AND ITS LIMITS 
Throughout the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court held that 
the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to new practices or technology, 
Congress often responded by passing statutes affording some level of 
protection.  Congress through a series of statutes has established a statutory 
regime regulating government access to third party records.  This regime 
erects a particular architecture of power significantly different from that of 
the Fourth Amendment.  These differences are both substantive (the types 
of records and information protected) and procedural (the means by which 
government officials can obtain records).  The architecture of this regime is 
certainly preferable to a void, but is nevertheless substantially inferior to 
that of the Fourth Amendment.  In this Part, I undertake an analysis of this 
regime, for it is the governing architecture of power for government 
information-collection from the private sector.  Unless the Court reverses 
course in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is this regime that must 
shoulder the burden of balancing order with liberty and keeping 
government power under control. 
A.  STATUTORY REGIME ARCHITECTURE: SCOPE 
1.  Wiretapping and Bugging 
When the Court held in Olmstead that the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply to wiretapping, Congress responded six years later by enacting § 605 
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.332  Pursuant to § 605,  “no 
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any 
 
 331. Id. 
 332. Former 7 U.S.C. § 605. 
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communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communications to any 
person.”333  Section 605 did not specify how it was to be enforced, but in 
Nardone v. United States, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied 
in federal court to evidence obtained by wiretapping in violation of § 
605.334  However, § 605 was a narrow law that did not apply to the states.  
Consequently, wiretapping by state law enforcement officials was regulated 
at the state level, and as an influential report concluded, state wiretapping 
regulation was relatively ineffective.335  Further, § 605 did not cover other 
means of electronic surveillance such as bugging.  Finally, the Department 
of Justice and the FBI interpreted § 605 as only preventing the 
“divulgence” of information obtained by wiretapping in court, while not 
prohibiting wiretapping if the information was not used at trial.336 
Section 605 governed wiretapping until United States v. Katz, when 
the Court finally declared that the Fourth Amendment covered wiretapping.  
In 1968, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act.337  Title III of the Act substantially improved the law of wiretapping, 
extending its reach to state officials as well as to private parties.338 
In 1986, Congress amended Title III with the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).  The ECPA restructured Title III 
into three titles: Title I (known as the “Wiretap Act”), dealing with the 
interception of communications;339 Title II (known as the “Stored 
Communications Act”), covering access to stored communications and 
records;340 and Title III (known as the “Pen Register Act”), dealing with 
pen registers and trap and trace devices.341 
Three types of communications are covered by the ECPA.  A “wire 
communication” consists of all “aural” transmissions that travel through a 
wire, cable, or similar medium.342  “Aural” means that the transmission 
must contain a human voice at some point.343  An “oral communication,” is 
 
 333. Id. 
 334. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 335. See generally DASH, SCHWARTZ, & KNOWLTON, supra note 293. 
 336. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 260 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 337. Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2001). 
 338. See REGAN, supra note 141, at 122–25. 
 339. Wiretap Act, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title I, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2001). 
 340. Stored Communications Act, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title II, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2701–11 (2000). 
 341. Pen Register Act, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2000). 
 342. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000). 
 343. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18). 
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one that is “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying 
such expectation.”344  Typically, oral communications are those intercepted 
through bugging devices.345  Finally, the third type of communication 
defined by the ECPA is an “electronic communication.”  Electronic 
communications are all nonwire and nonoral communications that can be 
transferred through a wide variety of mechanisms.346  Typically these 
consist of text and images (not the human voice)—an e-mail for 
instance.347 
Title I applies to wiretapping and bugging.  A communication must be 
intercepted in “flight,” during transmission.  Title I thus somewhat overlaps 
with the Fourth Amendment because under Katz, the Fourth Amendment 
applies to wiretapping.  Title I further contains an exclusionary rule, 
making any unlawfully acquired evidence inadmissible.348  However, in a 
significant limitation, the exclusionary rule does not apply to electronic 
communications.349  Therefore, the interception of an e-mail is not 
protected by the exclusionary rule.350 
Title I has strict requirements for obtaining a court order in order to 
engage in electronic surveillance.351  In certain respects, Title I’s 
requirements are stricter than those for a Fourth Amendment search 
warrant.  For instance, Title I restricts the type of officials who may apply 
for a court order and requires that the officials demonstrate that other 
means for obtaining the information have been unsuccessful.352  A Title I 
court order requires probable cause and a specific description of where the 
communication will be intercepted, the type of communication, and the 
period of time for the interception.353  Further, Title I limits the types of 
crimes that can be investigated with electronic surveillance.  For example, a 
court order cannot be obtained to investigate a misdemeanor.  Title I also 
requires that the court order mandate that the interception be conducted in a 
 
 344. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 
 345. Id. § 2510(4). 
 346. Id. § 2510(12). 
 347. See id. 
 348. Id. § 2518 (10)(a) (2000). 
 349. See id. 
 350. See id. 
 351. Id. § 2518. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
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way so as to “minimize the interception of communications not subject to 
interception.”354 
With the exception of electronic communications, which are not 
protected by an exclusionary rule, Title I has substantial protections.  
However, they cover ground already safeguarded by the Fourth 
Amendment.  As will be illustrated below, the architecture of the statutory 
regime is much weaker and more porous in the areas not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. 
2.  Stored Communications 
Communications service providers frequently store their customers’ 
communications.  These probably fall under the third party-record rule of 
Smith v. Maryland355 and United States v. Miller356 because third parties 
maintain the information.357 
Although the Fourth Amendment may not protect stored 
communications, Title II of the ECPA provides some protection.  Title II 
governs stored communications, such as those stored by a phone company 
or ISP.358  ISPs temporarily store e-mail communications.  For example, 
suppose Doe sends an e-mail to Roe.  The e-mail travels to Roe’s ISP and 
sits there until Roe logs on and downloads her e-mail.  Under certain 
circumstances, a copy of that e-mail may even be kept by Roe’s ISP after it 
is downloaded.  With many ISPs, users can also keep copies of previously 
read e-mail on the ISP’s server.  Maintaining copies of previously read e-
mail with an ISP can be particularly useful, since this enables a person to 
access the e-mails from remote locations via the Internet.  Conversely, if a 
copy of an e-mail is not kept on the ISP’s computer, then it can be accessed 
only from the particular computer to which it was downloaded.  
Additionally, ISPs often maintain an outbox folder that contains copies of 
all the e-mail that a person has sent out. 
Title II restricts the government’s ability to access communications 
stored by Roe’s ISP.359  Unfortunately, Title II is quite confusing and its 
protection is limited.  Electronic storage is defined as “any temporary, 
 
 354. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 
 355. 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). 
 356. 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976). 
 357. This conclusion is debatable, however, because telephone companies can also store telephone 
communications, and it is unlikely that the Court would go so far as to say that this fact eliminates any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in such communications. 
 358. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–71. 
 359. Id. § 2701. 
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intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to 
the electronic transmission thereof,” and “any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of 
backup protection.”360  This definition clearly covers e-mail that is waiting 
on the ISP’s server to be downloaded.  However, what about e-mail that 
has been downloaded by the recipient but maintained by the user on the 
ISP’s server?  According to the Department of Justice’s interpretation of 
Title II, the copy of the e-mail stored on the server is no longer in 
temporary storage, and is therefore “simply a remotely stored file.”361  Title 
II permits law enforcement officials to obtain copies of these 
communications merely by issuing a subpoena to the ISP.362 
Therefore, the process required for government officials to obtain 
access to stored communications is considerably less stringent than the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  Under Title II, the government 
must only secure a warrant to obtain the contents of communications in 
electronic storage for 180 days or less.363  In the DOJ’s view, these 
communications encompass only unopened e-mail and not previously 
accessed e-mail stored on an ISP’s server.  For communications stored over 
180 days, the government need only obtain an administrative, grand jury or 
trial subpoena, or a court order.364  No probable cause is required.  The 
government must only offer “specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds” to believe communications are “relevant” to 
the criminal investigation.365  Recall that Title II does not have an 
exclusionary rule. 
3.  Records of Communications Providers 
Title II also governs a communications service provider’s disclosure 
of customer records to the government.  These provisions differ from the 
parts of Title II that govern stored communications.  Stored 
communications consist of the traffic of one’s correspondence with others, 
while customer records consist of information about the customer including 
 
 360. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (emphasis added). 
 361. KERR, supra note 309, § III.B. 
 362. Id. at § III.D.1.  The government must provide prior or delayed notice to the individual.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) & (b)(2). 
 363. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 364. Id. § 2703(b). 
 365. Id. § 2703(d).  If the government does not want to provide prior notice to the subscriber that 
it is seeking the information, it must obtain a warrant.  Id. § 2703(b).  However, in a number of 
circumstances, notice can be delayed for up to three months after information has been obtained.  Id. § 
2705. 
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name, address, phone numbers, billing records, and types of services the 
customer has utilized.366  Recently, the USA-PATRIOT Act has expanded 
the information that can be obtained from customer records with a 
subpoena to include “records of session times and durations,” “any 
temporarily assigned network address,” and “any credit card or bank 
account number” used for payment.367 
Under Title II, a communications service provider “shall disclose a 
record or other information” about a customer when the government 
obtains a court order.368  A Title II court order only requires that the 
government provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”369 
One of the most important pieces of information an ISP has in its 
records is the customer’s identity.  A customer may use a pseudonym (a 
screen name), and an ISP may have information linking that pseudonym to 
the customer’s real name.  Thus, an ISP often holds the key to one’s ability 
to communicate anonymously on the Internet.  The government often wants 
to obtain this information to identify a particular speaker. 
For example, in United States v. Hambrick,370 a police officer served 
the defendant’s ISP, Mindspring, with a blatantly invalid subpoena that had 
been “judicially” authorized by another police officer.371  Although the 
court recognized that the subpoena was invalid, the evidence was not 
suppressed due to Title II’s lack of an exclusionary remedy.372 
In United States v. Kennedy, an anonymous person called an employee 
at Road Runner (the defendant’s ISP) and informed him that while 
scanning other computers on the Internet, he had discovered child 
pornography on the computer of the defendant, who was a Road Runner 
customer.373  The caller gave Road Runner the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address of the defendant’s computer.374  Road Runner then contacted the 
FBI.375  The FBI obtained a court order for the defendant’s subscriber 
 
 366. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C). 
 367. Id. § 2703(c)(2), amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 210. 
 368. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B). 
 369. Id. § 2703(d). 
 370. 55 F. Supp.2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999). 
 371. Id. at 506. 
 372. See id. at 509. 
 373. 81 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1106 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
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information.376  Eventually this led to the defendant’s conviction for 
possession of child pornography.377  The court rejected the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment claim based on the third party doctrine: “When the 
defendant entered into an agreement with Road Runner for Internet service, 
he knowingly revealed all information connected to [his] IP address.”378  
Instead, Title II applied, and the court concluded had that the court order 
was defective because the government’s application failed to state enough 
specific facts to meet Title II’s requirements.  However, the court noted 
that there was no suppression remedy for such violations.379 
4.  Pen Registers, E-mail Headers, and Websurfing 
The ECPA also attempts to fill the void left by Smith v. Maryland by 
addressing pen registers and trap and trace devices.  Under Title III of the 
ECPA, the government must obtain a court order before installing and 
using a pen register or trap and trace device.380  However, the court order 
merely requires that the government demonstrate that “the information 
likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”381  In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, probable 
cause is not required, nor must the target be a criminal suspect.  Once the 
government official makes the proper certification, the court must issue the 
order.  Consequently, courts have little discretion in granting Title III 
orders.382  Orders can last up to sixty days.383  Finally, there is no 
exclusionary rule for Title III violations. 
 The USA-PATRIOT Act of 2001 has substantially enlarged the 
definition of pen registers and trap and trace devices.  Where before a pen 
register was defined as a device that records “the numbers dialed . . . on the 
telephone line,” the new definition encompasses devices and processes that 
record “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information” for a wide 
variety of transmission facilities beyond telephone lines.384  A pen register 
now applies to addressing information on e-mails and to “IP addresses.”385  
 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. at 1104. 
 378. Id. at 1110. 
 379. See id. at 1111. 
 380. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (1994). 
 381. Id. § 3123(a) (1994). 
 382. “Upon application made under section 3122(a)(1), the court shall enter an ex parte order 
authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device. . . .”  Id. § 3123 (a)(1). 
 383. Id. § 3123(c). 
 384. Id. § 3127(3), as amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 216. 
 385. Id. 
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An IP address is the unique address assigned to a particular computer 
connected to the Internet.  All computers connected to the Internet have an 
IP address.  All websites also have an IP address.  Consequently, a list of IP 
addresses accessed reveals the various websites that a person has visited.  
Because websites are often distinctively tailored to particular topics and 
interests, a comprehensive list of them can reveal a lot about a person’s life. 
5.  Financial Records 
 Congress has filled the void created by United States v. Miller, which 
held that bank records are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) requires that government officials 
first obtain a warrant or subpoena before accessing financial information.386  
The subpoena merely requires a “reason to believe that the records sought 
are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”387  The customer 
must be served with the subpoena prior to its service on the financial 
institution. Notice, however, can be delayed in a number of 
circumstances.388  When information is “relevant to legitimate law 
enforcement inquiry” and subpoena authority is not available to the 
government, the government need only submit a formal written request for 
the information.389 
In addition to banks, credit-reporting agencies have detailed records 
for nearly every adult American consumer.  Under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, a consumer reporting agency “may furnish 
identifying information respecting any consumer, limited to his name, 
address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of 
employment, to a governmental agency.”390  Thus, the government can 
simply request this information without any court involvement.  If the 
government desires to obtain additional information contained in credit 
reports, it must obtain a court order or grand jury subpoena.391  The FCRA 
focuses on consumer reporting agencies.  Nothing in the FCRA limits the 
recipients of credit reports from disclosing them to the government.  Credit 
reports about an individual are frequently supplied to a variety of entities, 
such as banks, creditors, landlords, and employers. 
 
 386. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (1994).  For more information on the RFPA, see George B. 
Trubow & Dennis L. Hudson, The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978: New Protection from 
Federal Intrusion, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 487 (1979). 
 387. 29 U.S.C. § 3407. 
 388. Id. § 3409. 
 389. Id. § 3408. 
 390. 15 U.S.C. § 1681f (2000). 
 391. Id. § 1681b(a)(1). 
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Additionally, the FCRA requires a credit reporting agency to furnish 
the FBI with a list of all financial institutions where a person maintains an 
account “when presented with a written request” signed by the FBI director 
or designee.392  This provision is limited to foreign counterintelligence 
investigations and to individuals believed to be foreign agents.393 
Although the RFPA and FCRA protect financial information 
maintained by banks and credit reporting agencies, the government can 
obtain financial information from ISPs, employers, landlords, merchants, 
creditors, and database companies, among others.  Therefore, financial 
records are protected based only on which entities possess them.  Thus, the 
statutory regime merely provides partial protection of financial data. 
6.  Electronic Media Entertainment Records 
The statutory regime protects records pertaining to certain forms of 
electronic media entertainment.  Cable records are afforded a substantial 
amount of protection.  Cable service providers maintain records about their 
customers, including the fee-based channels, such as HBO, to which the 
customer subscribes along with the pay-per-view movies a customer 
orders.  Under the Cable Communications Policy Act (Cable Act) of 
1984,394 a government official must obtain a court order in order to obtain 
cable records.  The government must offer “clear and convincing evidence 
that the subject of the information is reasonably suspected of engaging in 
criminal activity and that the information sought would be material 
evidence in the case.”395  Further, the subject of the information can 
“appear and contest” the court order.396  This standard is more stringent 
than the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements.  
However, there is no exclusionary rule under the Cable Act.  The USA-
PATRIOT Act has limited the Cable Act by providing that it does not apply 
to cable Internet service.397  Thus, where a cable service provider acts as an 
ISP, the ECPA governs, not the Cable Act. 
In addition to cable records, the statutory regime also protects video 
tape rental records.  The Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988,398 
which was passed after reporters hadobtained Supreme Court Justice 
 
 392. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u. 
 393. See id. 
 394. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). 
 395. Id. § 551(h)(1). 
 396. Id. § 551(h)(2). 
 397. USA-PATRIOT Act § 211. 
 398. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2001). 
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Nominee Robert Bork’s video cassette rental records, states that a video 
tape service provider may disclose customer records to law enforcement 
officials “pursuant to a warrant . . . , an equivalent State warrant, a grand 
jury subpoena, or a court order.”399  Therefore, unlike the Cable Act, the 
level of protection under the VPPA is much less stringent. 
Although the statutory regime protects the records of certain forms of 
electronic media entertainment, it fails to protect the records of many 
others.  For example, records from music stores, electronics merchants, and 
Internet media entities are afforded no protection. 
7.  Medical Records 
The recently promulgated federal health privacy rules, pursuant to the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,400 
permit law enforcement officials to access medical records with a warrant, 
court order, or subpoena.401  Health information may also be disclosed “in 
response to a law enforcement official’s request for such information for 
the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness, 
or missing person.”402  Similar to the statutes governing other records, 
health information can be obtained with a mere subpoena. 
Not all health records, however, are covered by HIPAA.  Only records 
maintained by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care 
providers are covered.403  Doctors, hospitals, pharmacists, health insurers, 
and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are covered, but third 
parties that may have medical information are not covered.  Only 
organizations that engage in “standard transactions” under HIPAA’s 
administrative simplification process for health insurance claims fall within 
the protections of the regulations.404  For example, the sale of 
nonprescription drugs and the rendering of medical advice by many 
Internet health websites are not covered by HIPAA.405  As a recent report 
about the limits of HIPAA has concluded: 
Many Web sites offer a “health assessment” feature where users may 
enter all sorts of information from height and weight to drug and alcohol 
 
 399. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C). 
 400. The regulations are published at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–64 (2001). 
 401. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2001). 
 402. Id. § 164.512(f)(2). 
 403. Id. § 160.102 (2001). 
 404. PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND 
POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, EXPOSED ONLINE: WHY THE NEW FEDERAL HEALTH PRIVACY 
REGULATION DOESN’T OFFER MUCH PROTECTION TO INTERNET USERS 6–8 (Nov. 2001). 
 405. See id. at 7. 
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use. . . .  For example, HealthStatus.com offers free general health 
assessments as well as disease specific assessments to determine an 
individual’s risk for some of the leading causes of death. . . . [B]ecause 
HealthStatus.com does not accept any insurance it will not be covered by 
the privacy rule. . . .406 
Therefore, while certain health records are protected, many are not. 
8.  Holes in the Regime 
Federal statutes provide some coverage of the void left by the 
inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to records held by third parties.  
Although they apply to various types of information, such as 
communication records, financial records, entertainment records, and 
health records, these records are only protected when in the hands of 
certain third parties.  Thus, the statutory regime does not protect records 
based on the type of information contained in the records, but protects them 
based on the particular types of third parties that possess them. 
Additionally, there are gaping holes in the statutory regime of 
protection, with classes of records not protected at all.  Such records 
include those of merchants, both online and offline.  Records held by 
bookstores, department stores, restaurants, clubs, gyms, employers, and 
other companies are not protected.  Additionally, all the personal 
information amassed in profiles by database companies is not protected. 
There is a significant amount of activity on the Internet that is not 
covered by the ECPA, such as information collected by websites.  For 
example, consider In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation,407 where the 
court concluded that the use and access of cookies by DoubleClick did not 
violate the ECPA because the “DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites had 
consented to DoubleClick’s access of plaintiffs’ communications to 
them.”408  Moreover, records maintained by Internet retailers and websites 
are often not considered “communications” under the ECPA. 
Thus, the statutory regime is limited in its scope and has glaring 
omissions and gaps.  Further, the statutes are often complicated and 
confusing, and their protection turns on technical distinctions that can leave 
wide fields of information virtually unprotected. 
 
 406. Id. at 14, 17. 
 407. 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 408. See id. at 511. 
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B.  STATUTORY REGIME ARCHITECTURE: STRUCTURE 
Even where the statutory regime applies, it is deficient in the 
procedures it adopts to regulate the government’s access to third party 
records.  The statutory regime permits information to be obtained via court 
order of subpoenas—a significant departure from the Fourth Amendment 
which generally requires warrants supported by probable cause to be issued 
by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
Unlike warrants, subpoenas do not require probable cause and can be 
issued without judicial approval.  Prosecutors, not neutral judicial officers, 
can issue subpoenas.409  According to Stuntz: “[W]hile searches typically 
require probable cause or reasonable suspicion and sometimes require a 
warrant, subpoenas require nothing, save that the subpoena not be 
unreasonably burdensome to its target.  Few burdens are deemed 
unreasonable.”410  According to Ronald Degnan, subpoenas are not issued 
“with great circumspection” and are often “handed out blank in batches and 
filled in by lawyers.”411  As Stuntz contends, federal subpoena power is 
“akin to a blank check.”412 
Prosecutors can also use grand jury subpoenas to obtain third party 
records.413  Grand jury subpoenas are “presumed to be reasonable” and 
may only be quashed if “there is no reasonable possibility that the category 
of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the 
general subject of the grand jury investigation.”414  As Stuntz observes, 
grand jury subpoenas “are much less heavily regulated” than search 
warrants: 
As long as the material asked for is relevant to the grand jury’s 
investigation and as long as compliance with the subpoena is not too 
burdensome, the subpoena is enforced.  No showing of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion is necessary, and courts measure relevance and 
burden with a heavy thumb on the government’s side of the scales.415 
 
 409. Fisher, supra note 238, at 152. 
 410. Stuntz, supra note 252, at 857–58. 
 411. Ronan E. Degnan, Obtaining Witnesses and Documents (or Things), 108 F.R.D. 223, 232 
(1986). 
 412. Stuntz, supra note 252, at 864. 
 413. Grand juries are still used in some states as well as in the federal system.  See Degnan, supra 
note 411, at 229. 
 414. United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991). 
 415. Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1038. 
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Therefore, courts “quash or modify” subpoenas only “if compliance 
would be unreasonable or oppressive.”416  Further, “judges decide these 
motions by applying vague legal standards case by case.”417 
Court orders under most of the statutes are not much more constrained 
than subpoenas.  They typically require mere “relevance” to an ongoing 
criminal investigation, a standard significantly lower and looser than 
probable cause. 
The problem with subpoenas and court orders is that the judiciary has 
very limited oversight powers.  The role of the judge in issuing or 
reviewing subpoenas is to determine the extent of the burden of producing 
the evidence.  With this focus, financial hardship in producing information 
would give courts more pause when reviewing subpoenas than the potential 
invasions of privacy.  The role of the judiciary in court orders is also quite 
restricted.  For example, an order to install a pen register or trap and trace 
device under the ECPA merely requires that the applicant certify that the 
information sought be relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.418  
Courts cannot look beyond the certification nor inquire into the truthfulness 
of the facts in the application.  As one court has observed, the “judicial role 
in approving use of trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.”419  In 
short, judicial involvement with subpoenas and court orders amounts to 
nothing more than a rubber stamp of judicial legitimacy. 
In contrast, judges engage in a meaningful presearch review under the 
architecture of the Fourth Amendment.  Stronger standards force law 
enforcement officials to be more careful when applying for a warrant to 
engage in a search. 
The current statutory regime that has attempted to fill the void created 
by the judicial evisceration of the Fourth Amendment is inadequate 
because it results in the de facto watering down of the warrant and probable 
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  As warrants supported by 
probable cause are replaced by subpoenas and court orders supported by 
“articulable facts” that are “relevant” to an investigation, the role of the 
judge in the process is diminished to nothing more than a decorative seal of 
approval.  In many circumstances, neither court orders nor subpoenas are 
required.  The government can simply ask for the information. An 
 
 416. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling Wage, and Hour Admin., 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1946). 
 417. Stuntz, supra note 252, at 867. 
 418. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a). 
 419. United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995). See also KERR, supra note 309, 
§ IV.B. 
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individual’s privacy is protected only by the vague and toothless privacy 
policies of the companies holding their information. 
V.  RECONSTRUCTING THE ARCHITECTURE 
Today, much of our personal information is finding its way into the 
hands of third parties.  Moreover, given the Court’s current conception of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the architecture of power that 
regulates many of the government’s information-gathering practices is 
increasingly that of a confusing and gap-riddled statutory regime. 
One solution to fill the void is for the Court to reverse Smith v. Maryland 
and United States v. Miller.  Although Fourth Amendment architecture is 
significantly more protective than that of the statutory regime, the problem 
of how to regulate government access to third party records is not 
adequately addressed by Fourth Amendment architecture alone.  As 
discussed earlier, the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is 
the exclusionary rule, which prevents the government from introducing 
improperly obtained data during a criminal prosecution.  However, many 
information-gathering abuses often occur in the absence of prosecutions.  
Therefore, the exclusionary rule is not sufficiently protective. 
A better architecture of power to regulate government information-
gathering from third parties should be constructed.  In particular, such an 
architecture of power should prevent the types of problems associated with 
government information-gathering discussed earlier in Part II.C.  An 
architecture should address minimization, particularization, and control.  
First, government information-gathering should be minimized.  Sweeping 
investigations and vast stores of personal data in the hands of government 
entities present significant opportunities for the problematic uses discussed 
earlier.  Second, efforts at gathering data should be particularized to 
specific individuals suspected of criminal involvement.  Particularization 
requires law enforcement officials to exercise care in selecting the 
individuals who should be investigated, and it prevents dragnet 
investigations that primarily involve innocent people.  One of the most 
important aspects of keeping the government under control is to prevent its 
investigatory powers from being turned loose on the population at large.  
Third, government information-gathering and use must be controlled.  
There must be some meaningful form of supervision over the government’s 
information-gathering activity to ensure that it remains minimized and 
particularized.  Further, government information uses must be controlled to 
prevent abuses, drifts in the uses of information, and security lapses. 
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The aims of the architecture, however, are not the most difficult issue.  
Substantively, the architecture needs a scope.  Which information-
gathering activities should fall within the architecture’s scope?  
Procedurally, the architecture needs a mechanism for carrying out its aims.  
What type of structural controls should an architecture adopt? 
A.  SCOPE: SYSTEM OF RECORDS 
An architecture begins with substance.  It must provide guidance 
about which information-gathering activities it governs.  What is the 
appropriate scope of an architecture regulating government information-
gathering?  In particular, should the architecture cover all instances where 
the government gathers personal data from third parties?  Restricting all 
information gathering from third parties would prevent law enforcement 
officials from gathering initial information essential in developing 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.  For example, witnesses 
and victims are third parties that have information about the defendant.  If 
third parties are defined broadly, then the architecture could constrain the 
police substantially, perhaps impeding their ability to interview people 
when investigating a crime.420 
Consequently, a line must be drawn to distinguish the instances where 
third parties can voluntarily supply information to the government and 
where the government will be prohibited from accessing information or 
otherwise be restrained prior to procuring the data.  Although we may want 
to prevent Amazon.com from divulging to the government the log of books 
a person bought, we may not want to prohibit a person’s neighbor or a 
stranger from telling the police which books she happened to observe the 
person reading. 
An architecture must provide guidance for where the line is drawn.  
One way to draw the line is to focus on the type of data involved, 
distinguishing between “private” and “nonprivate” information.  The 
architecture would protect all personal information that is private.  
However, how is privacy to be defined?  The Court has defined privacy as 
total secrecy.  But this conception excludes most information held by third 
parties from the scope of protection. 
Another way to define private information is to focus on “intimate” 
information.  A number of commentators have contended that intimacy is 
 
 420. The early stages of government investigations frequently involve talking to victims, 
witnesses, friends, and neighbors.  The police often find out about a crime when people voluntarily 
report suspicious activity. 
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the essential characteristic of privacy.  For example, according to Julie 
Inness, “privacy’s content covers intimate information, access, and 
decisions.”421  According to Tom Gerety, “[i]ntimacy is the chief restricting 
concept in the definition of privacy.”422  However, what constitutes 
“intimate” information?  Without an adequate definition, “intimate” 
becomes nothing more than a synonym for “private.”  Commentators 
attempting to give substance to the word “intimacy” have defined the word 
too narrowly.  For example, Jeffrey Reiman views intimate information as 
pertaining to certain kinds of loving and caring relationships.423  Much 
private information, such as financial and health data, however, does not 
pertain to these types of relationships. 
The more fundamental problem with focusing on whether information 
is private is that privacy is a product of context, not the status of particular 
facts.  Easy distinctions such as intimate versus nonintimate and secret 
versus nonsecret fail to account for the complex nature of what is 
considered private.  Privacy is a dimension of social practices, activities, 
customs, and norms that are shaped by history and culture.424  The matters 
that are considered private and public have changed throughout history.  
Privacy is not a property of particular forms of information, since one can 
always lose privacy with respect to very sensitive and revealing facts about 
oneself.  For example, the fact that a person has leprosy may be considered 
private information.  But if that person becomes a public advocate for 
leprosy research and willingly announces to the public at large that she 
suffers from leprosy, the information is no longer private.  Few would say 
that the fact that President Franklin Roosevelt suffered from polio remains 
a private matter today.  Certainly, public disclosure does not eliminate the 
privacy of information; indeed, even information that is exposed to others 
may retain its private character.425  Nevertheless, privacy depends upon 
degrees of accessibility of information, and under certain circumstances, 
even highly sensitive information may not be private. 
 
 421. JULIE. C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992). 
 422. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 263 (1977).  For other 
commentators adopting an intimacy conception of privacy, see Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and 
Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 265 (Ferdinand David 
Schoeman ed. 1984), and Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, at 300. 
 423. James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN 
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 422, at 305–06. 
 424. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1129–30. 
 425. See Solove, supra note 50, at 1176–84. 
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Additionally, focusing on the type of information does not solve the 
problem of distinguishing between the neighbor’s tells the police what 
books he sees a person reading and Amazon.com’s providing the police 
with a complete inventory of the books the person has purchased.  By 
attempting to draw a line based upon the type of information, these two 
instances would be treated similarly.  Another example more radically 
illustrates the problem.  Many would deem information about a person’s 
genitals to be private information.  Should the police be required to obtain a 
warrant before talking to a victim of a sexual assault about an assailant’s 
genitals?  To many this would be absurd.  On the other hand, many would 
express serious objections if the police, without probable cause, could 
simply compel information about a person’s genitals from treating 
physicians. 
Further, making distinctions based on the particular status of certain 
forms of information fails to account for what I call the “aggregation 
problem.”  This problem is caused by the accumulation of details.  A fact 
here or there may seem innocuous but when combined, they become more 
telling about that person.  Similar to a Seurat painting, where a multitude of 
dots juxtaposed together form a picture, bits of information when 
aggregated paint a portrait about a person. 
Another way that a line could be drawn is based upon people’s 
expectations.  Such an approach would draw from the Court’s notion of 
“reasonable expectations of privacy.”  The problem with this approach, 
however, is that an empirical evaluation of expectations alone could 
gradually lead to the diminishment of privacy as more and more people 
come to expect that the records held by third parties can be readily obtained 
by the government.426 
If a line cannot be drawn based upon the type of information involved 
or people’s expectations of privacy, then how should the line be drawn?  
The answer must focus on relationships.  Privacy is not independent of the 
relationships of which it is a part.  Individuals readily share information in 
certain private relationships, such as the family.  In particular relationships 
people undertake certain risks including the risk of betrayal by one with 
whom confidences are shared.  The fact that there are expectations and 
 
 426. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 (1979) (noting that “where an individual’s 
subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth 
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in 
ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was”). 
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risks, however, does not mean that they must be the exclusive focus of our 
inquiry. 
The issue is not the conceivable risk of betrayal, but rather which risks 
people ought to assume and which risks people should be insured against.  
This determination has a normative dimension.  When a patient discloses 
an ailment to a doctor, arguably the patient assumes the risk that the doctor 
will disclose the information to the public.  However, there are several 
protections against this risk.  First, patient-physician confidentiality is 
preserved by norms of professional conduct for physicians established by 
ethical rules.  These rules include the Hippocratic Oath, which provides: 
“Whatever, in connection with my professional service, or not in 
connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be 
spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be 
kept secret.”427  Modern codes of medical ethics also require that 
physicians keep patient information confidential428 or risk losing their 
licenses for improper disclosures.  Patient-physician confidentiality is also 
protected in court with an evidentiary privilege.429  Further, courts have 
created tort law causes of action against physicians who disclose personal 
information.430  Finally, states have passed laws that protect against the 
disclosure of medical information.431  Thus, in numerous ways, the law 
structures the patient-physician relationship to protect against the risk of 
disclosure.  Similarly, the law of evidence has recognized the importance of 
protecting the privacy of communications between attorney and client,432 
priest and penitent,433 husband and wife,434 and psychotherapist and 
 
 427. Oath and Law of Hippocrates (circa 400 B.C.). 
 428. See Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the Amer. Med. Ass’n Canon 5.05 (1984) 
(observing that “the information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship between 
the physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree”). 
 429. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1996) (recognizing psychotherapist-patient 
privilege and social worker-patient privilege under the Federal Rules of Evidence); GLEN 
WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND 
AUTHORITY § 501.8. 
 430. See, e.g., Hammonds v. AETNA Casualty and Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (D. Ohio 
1965); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920).  Courts, however, have made exceptions 
in circumstances where disclosures must be made to protect the public.  Simonsen, 177 N.W. at 832.  
They have even imposed tort liability when physicians or psychotherapists fail to disclose data that 
could lead to imminent harm.  Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976). 
 431. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 199.21 (prohibiting disclosure of HIV test results); 
N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 17 (prohibiting disclosure of minors’ medical records pertaining to sexually 
transmitted diseases and abortion). 
 432. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 433. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 429, at 190. 
 434. See id. 
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patient.435  Our expectations in these relationships are the product of both 
existing norms and the norm-shaping power of the law.  As Christopher 
Slobogin notes, “in a real sense, we only assume those risks of unregulated 
government intrusion that the courts tell us we have to assume.”436 
Therefore, the scope of the architecture should be shaped by 
considerations regarding social relationships.  The architecture’s scope 
should encompass all instances when third parties share personal 
information (in other words, information pertaining to individuals) 
contained within a “system of records.”  This term is taken from the 
Privacy Act, which defines a “system of records” as “a group of any 
records under the control of any agency from which information is 
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, 
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”437  A 
“system of records” is used to distinguish between collecting information 
by speaking with specific individuals versus obtaining it through the vast 
stores of records held by companies. 
The problems described in Part II stem from the nature of 
relationships with certain third parties and the problems of the 
government’s collection and use of personal information.  Therefore, the 
inquiry should focus on at least two sets of relationships: relationships with 
the government and relationships with the third parties that possess 
personal information. 
 In relationships with the government, the focus should be on what the 
collective society wants the government to be able to know rather than 
whether certain matters are public or private based on the extent of their 
exposure to others.  The Court’s conception of privacy assumes that the 
government stands in the same shoes as everybody else, which is clearly 
not the case.  If we allow a loved one to read our diary, do we also want to 
the government to be able to read it?  As Anthony Amsterdam has 
observed: “For the tenement dweller, the difference between observation 
by neighbors and visitors who ordinarily use the common hallways and 
observation by policemen who come into hallways to ‘check up’ or ‘look 
around’ is the difference between all the privacy that his condition allows 
and none.”438 
 
 435. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15. 
 436. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar 
Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 400 (1997). 
 437. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(5) (2000). 
 438. Amsterdam, supra note 326, at 404. 
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Indeed, the existence of Fourth Amendment limits indicates that the 
government stands in a different position than ordinary citizens or private 
sector organizations.  The possibility of aggregation and the rise of digital 
dossiers argue in favor of regulating the government’s access to 
information. 
One cannot lose sight of the fact that an architecture of power is being 
developed.  The focus should be on the goals of the architecture rather than 
on technical distinctions over whether information is intimate enough or 
secret enough.  These questions should not derail attention from the 
important issue of whether government information-gathering activities 
present sufficient actual and potential dangers to warrant protection.  The 
problems discussed earlier regarding information flows from the private 
sector to the government stem from the extensiveness of the personal 
information that private sector entities are gathering today.  Focusing on  
“systems of records” targets the type of information flow that raises 
concern.  Because the problem of modern government information-
gathering is caused by the increasing dossiers maintained in private sector 
record systems, the architecture targets those third parties that store data in 
record systems. 
Our relationships with the entities that maintain record systems about 
us differ from other social relationships.  Records are a more detailed and 
systematic form of information gathering.  Though it is possible for the 
government to obtain personal data by interviewing friends and others, this 
is minimal compared to the systematic and profound sweep of information 
accessible through private sector record systems.  The information in 
records is more permanent in nature and is readily aggregated.  Thus, 
record systems are particularly dangerous because of their extensiveness 
and the ease with which information can be gathered, combined, stored, 
and analyzed. 
Further, entities that maintain systems of records collect data in a 
power dynamic where information disclosure is often not consensual.  A 
person can take considerable steps to prevent a stranger from gathering data 
without consent.  For example, a person who is overzealous in gathering 
information can be subject to laws prohibiting stalking or harassment. 
Relationships to employers and landlords, however, are different than 
those with our friends, neighbors, and even strangers.  Currently, 
employers and landlords have a substantial amount of power to gather 
personal information.  They often stand in an unequal position to that of the 
individual employees or tenants.  The nature of the relationship with 
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employers and landlords provides them with a significantly greater amount 
of power and control with regard to information gathering.  Moreover, the 
law often shapes these relationships to maintain or even further this 
disequilibrium of power. 
Relationships with merchants and communications providers might 
not be as directly coercive as those with the entities that govern our 
livelihoods and dwellings.  Because these relationships are more 
impersonal, perhaps it should be left to the market decide this issue.  If 
consumers demand companies that protect their information from the 
government, then the market will reflect these choices. 
Thus far, however, the market has not been responsive to this issue.  
As discussed earlier, privacy policies are often vague about information 
flows to the government.439  Individuals are usually unaware of the extent 
to which information about them is collected.440  As Edward Janger and 
Paul Schwartz point out, privacy is often a nonprice term in a negotiation 
that people do not adequately understand.  In addition, the market fails to 
afford sufficient incentives to correct this information asymmetry.441  
Further, private sector entities have never established a relationship with 
the people whose data they have collected. 
Even if people are informed, they have little choice but to hand over 
information to third parties.  Life in the Information Age depends upon 
sharing information with a host of third party entities including phone 
companies, ISPs, cable companies, merchants, financial entities, medical 
and insurance providers, and so on.  The Supreme Court in Smith and 
Miller has suggested that if people want to protect privacy, they should not 
share their information with third parties.  However, refraining from doing 
so may result in people living as Information Age hermits, without credit 
cards, banks, Internet service, phones and television.  The market does not 
seem to offer a wide array of choices for people on the basis of the amount 
of privacy they would like to protect.  People rarely seem to bargain about 
privacy policies, especially provisions about sharing information with the 
government.  The policies are not individually negotiated, but are one-size-
fits-all.  According to Schwartz, this state of affairs is caused by the 
problem of “bounded rationality” in which people, “when faced with 
standardized terms, . . . frequently accept whatever industry offers 
 
 439. See supra Part II.B. 
 440. Solove, supra note 7, at 1427–28. 
 441. Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, 
and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV.  1219, 1241–42 (2002). 
SOLO10.DOC 9/3/02  8:49 AM 
2002] DISSIPATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY 1159 
them.”442  Given the current state of affairs, there is little hope that the 
market will achieve adequate protection alone. 
Therefore, the scope of the architecture must be defined broadly to 
encompass any third party that maintains a “system of records.”  This 
definition of scope is not perfect, and there may be hard cases that call for 
exceptions.  However, this rule would provide clear guidance to law 
enforcement officials when gathering information from third parties.  This 
clarity is a virtue.  Unlike the existing statutory architecture, which is 
complicated and often full of notable gaps, this architecture has clear and 
simple boundaries. 
B.  STRUCTURE: REGULATED SUBPOENAS 
Many different procedural mechanisms are available to control 
government information gathering.  These mechanisms fall on a spectrum 
from no control over information-gathering on one end to complete 
restriction of it on the other.  In the middle of the spectrum are mechanisms 
of oversight—where the government can access information only upon 
making certain showings before a neutral and external party who must 
authorize the access. 
On the “no control” end of the spectrum, private sector entities may 
voluntarily disclose personal information to the government.  If it so 
desired, Amazon.com could connect its computers to those of the FBI.  If a 
private sector entity does not volunteer information, then the government 
can compel its production with a mere subpoena. The entity need not 
contest the subpoena or provide notice to the person to whom the 
information pertains.  Whether the entity does so would be left up to 
market forces—to contracts between the entity and the consumer or privacy 
policies. 
On the other end of the spectrum are architectural mechanisms of 
restriction—prohibitions on government collection and use of information.  
These mechanisms are embodied in the architecture of the Fifth 
Amendment and certain evidentiary privileges.  The Fifth Amendment 
provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself.”443  The Fifth Amendment’s “privilege against 
self-incrimination” prevents the government from compelling individuals 
to testify against themselves, and completely bars use of the information 
 
 442. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, supra note 6, at 822–23. 
 443. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
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obtained in violation of the right at trial.  In contrast, under the Fourth 
Amendment architecture, evidence is admissible at trial so long as the 
government obtains it pursuant to a valid search warrant. 
The architecture of evidentiary privileges resembles in many respects 
the architecture of the Fifth Amendment, because privileges bar access to 
certain evidence altogether.  Evidentiary privileges not only restrict the 
ability to obtain true information, but also the ability to present it at trial.  
As a result, privileges are sparingly recognized.  For example, when 
independent prosecutor Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky’s 
mother to testify against her daughter in front of a grand jury, there was a 
large public outcry at the tactic.444  Although in many states, spouses may 
refuse to testify against each other in a criminal trial about confidential 
information that is known to the spouse,445 most jurisdictions refuse to 
recognize a similar privilege for parents and children.446 
For certain relationships, complete restriction is necessary to protect 
the relationship.  Where privacy is essential to the functioning of 
relationships that have a high social value, then the architecture of 
privileges is highly protective.  Certain relationships depend upon the 
revelation of information.  Privileges protect against “the general evil of 
infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion and fear, into 
those communications which must take place.”447  As one court has noted, 
“by prearrangement with a criminal suspect’s priest, minister or rabbi, 
psychiatrist or other physician, or lawyer, the police could obtain 
information of great value in combating crime.  The only question is 
whether the price would be too high.”448  Certainly not all relationships that 
depend upon privacy are worth protecting.  For example, criminal 
conspirators need privacy, but we do not consider the protection of these 
relationships to be socially beneficial.  It is only those relationships that are 
important to society—such as the attorney-client and patient-physician 
relationships—that are protected by mechanisms of restriction. 
Often, however, privacy is not essential to the relationship’s existence, 
but is implicated in it.  Exchange of information is incidental to most 
 
 444. Ruth Marcus, To Some in the Law, Starr’s Tactics Show a Lack of Restraint, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 13, 1998, at A1. 
 445. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1980).  However, a spouse can waive the 
right to refuse to testify, and, if so, the defendant spouse cannot prevent his or her spouse from 
testifying.  Id. at 52–53. 
 446. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that most federal and state 
courts have rejected the privilege). 
 447. Pearse v. Pearse, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (1846). 
 448. United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Colo. 1982). 
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commercial transactions and employment relationships.  Adopting 
mechanisms of restriction to these relationships would herald a return to the 
regime of Boyd v. United States.449 
In Boyd, the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
prevented the government from issuing a subpoena to obtain a person’s 
private papers.450  Later, in Gouled v. United States,451 the Court held that 
search warrants could not be used to gain access to one’s “house or office 
or papers” merely to obtain evidence to use against that person in a 
criminal proceeding.452  Under the rationale of Boyd and Gouled, the 
government could seize papers if they were instrumentalities of a crime or 
illegal contraband but not if they were merely evidence of a crime.  This 
rule became known as the “mere evidence” rule. 
The Boyd and Gouled regime has long been dismantled.  The mere 
evidence rule was overturned in Warden v. Hayden,453 where the Court 
eliminated the rule and permitted searches to find evidence of crimes.454 
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment was virtually eliminated as a protection 
against government access to personal information in records.  In Shapiro 
v. United States,455 the Court held that requiring a person to produce 
required records did not violate the Fifth Amendment.  In Couch v. United 
States,456 the government issued a subpoena to the defendant’s accountant 
to obtain documents pertaining to its investigation of tax fraud.457  The 
defendant challenged the subpoena on the basis that it violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination.458  The Court 
rejected the challenge reasoning that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is a 
personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information 
that may incriminate him.”459  Because the subpoena was issued on a third 
party, “[i]nquisitorial pressure or coercion against a potentially accused 
person, compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning words or 
produce incriminating documents is absent.”460  Likewise, in Fisher v. 
 
 449. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 450. See id. at 638. 
 451. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
 452. Id. at 309. 
 453. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
 454. See id. at 309–10. 
 455. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 456. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
 457. See id. at 323. 
 458. See id. 
 459. Id. at 328. 
 460. Id. at 329. 
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United States,461 the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not 
apply to subpoenas issued upon a person’s attorney.462  The Fifth 
Amendment, reasoned the Court, “protects against compelled self-
incrimination, not the disclosure of private information.”463  In other words, 
according to the Court, the Fifth Amendment could not “serve as a general 
protector of privacy” and was limited to protecting against only the 
compulsion to testify against oneself.464 
Resurrecting the “mere evidence” rule and applying it to third party 
records would effectively bar the government from seeking and using 
records entirely unless they were the very instrumentalities through which a 
crime was perpetrated.  This would cripple modern criminal investigation.  
As Stuntz observes: “Government regulation require[s] lots of information, 
and Boyd came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a blanket 
entitlement to nondisclosure.  It is hard to see how modern health, safety, 
environmental, or economic regulation would be possible in such a 
regime.”465  Because Boyd rested in part on the Fifth Amendment, it 
completely prevented the government from obtaining and using the papers 
against the defendant no matter what procedure the government had used to 
obtain them. 
In the middle of the spectrum are mechanisms of oversight.  An 
architecture containing this type of mechanism is preferable to regulate 
government access of records held by third parties maintaining “systems of 
records.”  Mechanisms of oversight allow the government to gather 
information by making adequate showings before a neutral detached party.  
Oversight is embodied in the Fourth Amendment’s per se warrant rule.  
The warrant requirement achieves the aims of minimization, 
particularization, and control.  Collection is minimized by the requirement 
that the government justify that its information gathering is legitimate and 
necessary.  The warrant ensures particularization with its requirement that 
there be probable cause that a particular person be engaged in criminal 
activity.  Finally, the warrant achieves control (at least over the collection 
efforts) by having a neutral and detached party authorize the collection. 
In many cases, warrants are the best regulatory device for government 
information-gathering.  Often, at the point during an investigation that 
certain information from third parties becomes important for law 
 
 461. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 462. See id. at 414. 
 463. Id. at 401 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
 464. Id. 
 465. Stuntz, supra note 215, at 1050. 
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enforcement officials to obtain, there is already enough evidence to support 
a warrant.  In both Smith and Miller there was probably sufficient evidence 
for the police to secure warrants.  Therefore, the requirement of a warrant 
hopefully prevents cases of illegitimate abuses such as large-scale 
information sweeps and investigations without particularized suspicion, 
without unduly interfering with legitimate law enforcement activities.  
Further, third party records have few of the dangers that make warrants 
inefficient.  For example, because third parties maintain the records, there 
are fewer opportunities for a suspect to hide or destroy documents during 
the time law enforcement officials obtain a warrant. 
However, as discussed above, merely applying the Fourth Amendment 
to government access to private sector records proves inadequate.  First, is 
difficult to incorporate the “system of records” scope into the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonable expectations of privacy approach to determining 
the scope of protection.  Second, the exclusionary rule only provides a 
remedy at trial, and many of the abuses associated with government 
information-gathering extend far beyond criminal trials. 
Despite being far more permissive for government information-
gathering purposes, subpoenas have certain protections not available with 
search warrants.  Unlike warrants, they can be challenged prior to the 
seizure of the documents.  The subpoenaed party can refuse to comply and 
make a motion to quash before a judge.  Further, subpoenas permit the 
target to produce the documents rather than have government agents 
rummage through the party’s home or belongings.466  The advantages of 
subpoenas over search warrants are best illustrated in Zurcher v. The 
Stanford Daily,467 where the police searched a newspaper’s offices for 
evidence relating to a criminal suspect.  The newspaper was not involved in 
the alleged crime; it merely possessed evidence.  The Court upheld the 
search because it was made pursuant to a valid warrant.  Dissenting justices 
contended that there were First Amendment concerns with such searches 
because they would disrupt newspaper operations and result in “the 
possibility of disclosure of information received from confidential sources, 
or of the identity of the sources themselves.”468  Congress responded to 
Zurcher by passing the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,469 which restricts 
the use of search warrants for offices of newspapers and other media 
 
 466. Fisher, supra note 238, at 151. 
 467. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 468. Id. at 571. 
 469. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994). 
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entities for evidence of crimes of other parties.  In effect, the Act requires 
the use of subpoenas rather than warrants to obtain such evidence. 
The benefits of subpoenas, however, often do not apply to subpoenas 
for an individual’s records issued on third parties because the third party 
does not need to notify the target or may not have any incentive to 
challenge the subpoena in court.470  Further, as discussed before, subpoenas 
have many weaknesses compared to warrants, such as a lack of requiring 
particularized suspicion and little protection by way of oversight by the 
judiciary.471 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment architecture should be resurrected 
statutorily, by heightening the standards required for the government to 
obtain a subpoena or court order.  In this way, the statutory regime could 
require more stringent requirements for subpoenas and court orders, such as 
notice to the target and particularized suspicion.  In other words, subpoenas 
and court orders could be strengthened to resemble warrants.  This 
statutory regime would incorporate the exclusionary rule, a minimum 
statutory damages provision, and a framework by which to discipline 
offending law enforcement officials. 
If subpoenas are not made identical to warrants, an alternative 
structural device, a “regulated subpoena,” could be used.  A regulated 
subpoena would be similar to a warrant.  It would require notice to the third 
party from whom the records are sought and to the subject of the records 
being searched so that they may be able to contest the subpoena.  In certain 
exigent circumstances, there may be exceptions to notice, as there are 
currently for warrants.472 
The regulated subpoena would require probable cause that the suspect 
is engaged in criminal activity.  Specific records need not directly contain 
evidence of criminal activity but must be of “material importance” to the 
investigation.  This differs from the standards often used by the statutory 
regime for subpoenas and court records in two respects.  First, unlike the 
existing court order standard, where the person to whom the records pertain 
need not be involved in criminal activity at all, the regulated subpoena 
requires that the government demonstrate probable cause that the person is 
engaged in criminal activity.  Second, unlike “relevance,” the standard of 
 
 470. Some states, such as California, have enacted laws requiring the notification of the people to 
whom the records pertain.  See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1985.3; Degnan, supra note 411, at 233. 
 471. See supra Part IV.B. 
 472. I am not contending that all of the existing exceptions to notice are valid; rather, I believe 
that some of these exceptions are acceptable. 
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“material importance” is narrower.  It is slightly more permissive than that 
of a warrant, which requires that the records contain evidence of criminal 
activity.  However, unlike a warrant, the regulated subpoena can be 
challenged in court. 
This approach is similar to courts’ imposing heightened requirements 
when private parties seek to subpoena the identities of anonymous 
speakers.  Consider, for example, Doe v. 2TheMart.com,473 where the court 
held that a subpoena for the identities of anonymous speakers requires 
heightened standards to protect the right to speak anonymously.474  
According to the court, four factors determine whether a subpoena can be 
issued: 
(1) the subpoena seeking the information [must be] issued in good faith 
and not for any improper purpose, (2) the information sought relates to a 
core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information is directly and 
materially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) information 
sufficient to establish or disprove that claim or defense is unavailable 
from other sources. 
Other courts have articulated similar tests.475  Even based on existing 
law, government subpoenas that compel information to reveal the identity 
of an anonymous speaker would seemingly fall within the reasoning of 
these courts and require heightened standards.  However, a regulated 
subpoena would apply beyond situations where information is likely to 
affect anonymous speech to other forms of personal information. 
The regulated subpoena requirement would contain certain exceptions.  
The general rule is that third parties maintaining personal information in a 
“system of records” cannot voluntarily disclose information to the 
government.  Under compelling circumstances, however, third parties 
maintaining systems of records should be able to disclose facts voluntarily 
to the government.  Compelling circumstances might include an imminent 
threat of harm to another.  Another exception would allow the individual to 
whom the records pertain to authorize the government to obtain them from 
the third party without having to meet the heightened standards of the 
regulated subpoena.  For example, if a victim of computer hacking wanted 
to permit the government to access the victim’s ISP records, the victim 
could authorize the government to do so. 
 
 473. 140 F. Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 474. Id. at 1089–93. 
 475. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
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Whether by reversing the third party doctrine, imposing Fourth 
Amendment restrictions on subpoenas, or restricting subpoenas via statute, 
the important point is that all of these approaches incorporate some of the 
central aspects of Fourth Amendment architecture: requiring a limitation in 
scope of the information that may be obtained and requiring meaningful 
external oversight. 
C.  REGULATING POST-COLLECTION USE OF DATA 
The procedural architectural features discussed in the previous section 
are not sufficient to afford adequate protection to privacy.  Another 
problem that must be addressed is the way personal information is used 
once it has been collected.  As Stuntz astutely observes: “Fourth 
Amendment law regulates the government’s efforts to uncover information, 
but it says nothing about what the government may do with the information 
it uncovers.  Yet as the Clinton investigation shows, often the greater 
privacy intrusion is not the initial disclosure but the leaks that follow.”476  
Carol Steiker notes: “Unlike other countries in North America and Western 
Europe, the United States [has] never developed a national plan to organize 
a ‘system’ of policing or to provide for centralized control over police 
authority.”477  Once information is collected, the Fourth Amendment’s 
architecture of oversight no longer applies.  This is problematic, as many of 
the abuses of information by the government discussed earlier occur after 
the information has been collected. 
The Privacy Act of 1974478 provides some limited regulation of 
records maintained by government law enforcement entities.  However, the 
Act contains many exceptions and loopholes that have limited its 
effectiveness.  Government entities can share information widely with each 
other.  Further, information may be disclosed for any “routine use,” an 
exception that many have criticized as a significant loophole.479  As Robert 
Gellman astutely observes, the Privacy Act provides a “vague standard” 
that fails to serve as “a significant barrier to the sharing of personal 
information within agencies.”480  Additionally, the Act applies only to the 
federal government.  Fewer than a third of the states have a privacy law 
similar to the Privacy Act.481 
 
 476. Stuntz, supra note 252, at 857. 
 477. Steiker, supra note 121, at 834. 
 478. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 479. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 585–86. 
 480. Gellman, supra note 141, at 198. 
 481. Solove, supra note 50. 
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The Privacy Act is an important first step in reigning in the vast stores 
of data that government entities collect.  There remains, however, much 
room for the Privacy Act to be improved and strengthened.  One possible 
way to provide a safeguard is to mandate the destruction of data after 
certain periods of time or, mandate the transfer of data to the judicial 
branch, after a certain period of time, for access only under special 
circumstances.  Another way is to adopt a meaningful-purpose 
specification restriction.  This means that, with certain reasonable 
exceptions, information collected from third party records may only be 
used for the particular purpose for which it is collected. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
One of the most significant threats to privacy of our times, 
government information-gathering and-use, is inadequately regulated.  The 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been mired in the difficulties 
of conceptualizing privacy, thus preventing the application of the Fourth 
Amendment.  A statutory regime has arisen to fill the void, but it is 
severely flawed.  A new architecture of power must be constructed, one 
that effectively regulates the government’s collection and use of third party 
records.  This task is not easy in a rapidly changing society that is adjusting 
to the profound new dimensions of the Information Age.  This Article is 
thus a beginning of the process. 
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